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INTRODUCTION
This  is an  article about  economic justifications  for the legal  in-
stitutions  of private property  and enforceable  contract.  There is,  of
course,  an  enormous  literature  addressed  to  such  questions.'  At
1.  The  early literature of political economy contained  much discussion  of legal
institutions.  See, e.g.,  J.  S.  MILL,  PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY  Book  V (1st
ed.  1848).  A  second  wave  is  typified  by  J.  COMMONS,  LEGAL  FOUNDATIONS  OF
CAPITALISM  (1957)  (first published  in 1924) and R.  ELY,  PROPERTY  AND  CONTRACT
IN THEm  RELATIONS  TO  THE  DISTRIBUTION  OF  WEALTH  (1957)  (first published  in
1914).  For  a  sampling  of current  approaches,  see  ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS  OF
PROPERTY  LAW (B.  Ackerman  ed.  1975)  [hereinafter  cited  as  ECONOMIC  FOUNDA-
TIONS];  THE  ECONOMICS  OF  CONTRACT  LAW  (A.  Kronman  &  R. Posner  eds.  1979)
[Vol.  8:711
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present,  most  discussions  focus  on  the  advisability  of  proposals
about  specific  legal  rules.  For  example,  the  issue  might  be  the
choice  between  zoning,  covenants,  and nuisance  law  as  systems  of
land use control, 2 or the  choice of a remedy  for the tender of non-
conforming  goods.3  There has  also  long existed a jurisprudential  or
theoretical  literature  proposing  general  defenses  of the  economic
virtues  of property and contract.  For example,  Blackstone  asserted
that:
As  human  life  also  grew  more and  more refined,  abundance  of
conveniences  were  devised to render it more  easy,  commodious,
and agreeable;  as,  habitations  for shelter and  safety,  and raiment
for warmth and  decency.  But no man would be at the trouble  to
provide either,  so  long  as he  had only  an  usufructuary  property
in  them,  which  was  to  cease  the  instant  that  he  quitted  pos-
session.
4
The  literature  of the  contemporary  law  and  economics movement5
deals  with  both  the  general  question  and problems  of specific  ap-
plication.  It  is  distinguished  from  its  forbears  both  by  its  self-
conscious  choice of a norm of economic virtue ("efficiency") and by
its elaboration  of techniques for economic analysis  of legal material.
This  Article,  by contrast with  all the  literature  just described,
neither  argues  for  (or against)  any  legal  rules  or  institutions  nor
proposes  a  proper  role  or  technique  for  economic  analysis.  It  is
concerned,  in the first place,  with what may  appear  to be a task  of
mere  intellectual  housekeeping:  that  of cataloguing  and refuting  in
detail a number of  false arguments and  suppositions about  the eco-
nomic  virtues of private property and free contract.  The arguments
that concern  us are  those purporting  to justify the legal institutions
in question  by  reference  only  (a) to  a very  weak,  highly  plausible
value judgment that we should do  things that make  or could make
everyone affected  more satisfied than they would otherwise be,  and
(b)  to  a  very  weak,  highly  plausible  factual  judgment  that people
tend most of the time to act as though they had goals and were try-
[hereinafter  cited  as  EcoNomics  OF  CONTRACT  LAwI;  THE  INTERACTION  OF  Eco-
NOMICS  AND  LAW (B.  Siegan ed. 1977).
2.  E.g.,  Ellickson,  Alternatives to Zoning, in  ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS,  supra
note 1, at 265.
3.  E.g.,  Priest,  Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Non-conforming Goods,
in ECONOMICS  OF CONTRACT  LAw, supra note  1, at 167.
4.  2 W. BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES  *4.
5.  See generally G.  CALABRESI,  THE  COSTS  OF ACCIDENTS  (1970);  R.  POSNER,
ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
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ing  to  achieve  them-i.e.,  that people  are  rational  maximizers  of
satisfactions.
The first part of the Article  sets forth  and successively  refutes
five  arguments  of this  type for private  property.  The  second  part
does  the  same  for  free  contract,  noting  the  close  parallelism  be-
tween  false  property  and  false  contract  arguments.  The  result  of
this  exercise, we  believe,  is  to show  convincingly,  if nonrigorously,
that any  argument for the  economic  virtue  ("efficiency") of any  le-
gal  rule  must  depend  on  specific  assumptions  about  the  actual
wants  and  factual  circumstances  of  the  persons  affected  by  the
choice  among possible  rules-that  is,  that the efficiency  of private
property and free  contract cannot be deduced from the  sole factual
supposition of rational maximizing behavior.
This is  not, we readily  acknowledge,  an original  result, or one
that will  surprise  economically  sophisticated  readers.  Still,  not all
consumers  of  economics-oriented  law-related  literature  are  eco-
nomically  sophisticated,  and  the  mistakes  we  catalogue  are  occa-
sionally  committed---or  at any  rate not always  guarded against-by
writers who  are.  It may therefore be useful to provide this guide to
traps for the unwary.
If it  is  true  that  no  one  who  thinks  competently  about  the
question  believes  that  the  efficiency  of  legal  rules  can  ever  be
finally  determined  without  concrete  knowledge  of people's  actual
wants,  circumstances,  and proclivities,  it is also  true  that much  le-
gal  and  related policy-analytic  literature  reflects  and reinforces  the
view that certain  legal institutions (e.g.,  private property,  free con-
tract) are  in  some sense  generally or presumptively efficient,  while
others  (e.g.,  central  regulatory  command,  commonses)  are  gen-
erally  or  presumptively  inefficient,  for  a  population  of  rational
maximizers. 6 In Part III of the Article,  building  on the catalogue  of
errors  in  Parts  I and  II,  we  undertake  to  show that  any  notion  of
the  presumptive  efficiency  of  private  property  and  free  contract
must be untenable.  We  there argue  that any  actually efficient  re-
gime,  though it may well contain rules fairly characterizable  as pri-
vate property and free  contract,  must contain them  in combination
with  rules  drawn  from  realms  perceived  as  opposite  to  private
property/free  contract  (viz.,  unowned  commonses  and  collective
controls)  so  that there is  no more  reason  for awarding  the  palm  of "presumptive  efficiency"  to  private  property/free  contract  than  to
its opposites.
6.  A  classic  example  is  Hardin,  The Tragedy of the  Commons,  in  ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS,  supra note  1, at 2.
[Vol.  8: 711
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I.  FIVE  FALSE  ARGUMENTS  FOR  PRIVATE  PROPERTY
In  this Part, we take  up a series  of arguments for private prop-
erty,  and  show that each  depends  on  empirical  assumptions  addi-
tional to that of rational maximizing  behavior.  Throughout,  we will
be contrasting the property regime,  or PP, with two other regimes,
since  economic  arguments  for  PP always  make  some  implicit com-
parison  with  alternative  possibilities.  The  two  other  regimes  are
the  state  of  nature  (SON)  and  the  regime  of forced  sharing  for
needs (FSN).
A property regime  (PP) is  one in which things  of value are  as-
signed  to  owners,  who  have  the  following  rights  with  respect  to
them:  (a) they  can  consume  them,  or  use  them  to  produce  other
things  of value,  which  they  will  also  own;  (b)  they  can  get  the
state's  help  in  preventing  any  nonowner  from  consuming  them  or
using  them  for  production  without  the  owner's  consent;  and  (c)
owners  have exclusive  power  to  transfer  ownership  to others,  with
the state  recognizing  and then enforcing the transfer. This is admit-
tedly  a very  rough,  and  in  a number  of respects  a weasel-worded
definition,  but it is adequate  for our present purposes.  In Part III,
where  we  take  up  the  problems  of the  boundaries  and  internal
structure  of the  property concept, we will  offer a much more  tech-
nically precise definition.
In  the  state  of nature  (SON)  there  is  no  ownership  of  any-
thing,  and no institution  of legally  enforced contract  either.  People
may  simply do as  they wish,  using whatever means  are  available  to
them-subject  to  everyone  else  doing  likewise.  Conceptually,  the
distinction between  PP and SON is  that in PP ownership  rights are
assumed  to be automatically and universally respected--or,  equiva-
lently,  perfectly  and  costlessly  protected  by  an  absolutely  reliable
and irresistible  force  ("the state");  whereas  in  SON,  while there  is
always  the  contingent possibility  of some people,  perhaps  by pre-
arrangement,  coming forcefully  to the  aid of others seeking protec-
tion or vindication  for ownership-like  positions,  actual protection  or
vindication  will  always  depend  on the hazards  of specific,  concrete
tests of strength (will, wit,  etc.).
Forced  sharing  for  needs  (FSN) resembles  private  property,
except  that  ownership  is  qualified  in  the  following  way:  Anyone
who  "needs"  a thing and doesn't own it (or its equivalent in cash or
credit) may take  or requisition it from anyone else who  owns it and
doesn't "need" it, and  the state  will intervene,  if necessary,  on the
side of the needy taker. We  can imagine rules  defining need objec-
tively,  either in very general  terms (e.g.,  having in one's ownership
1980]
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at this moment less than two-thirds  of the per capita  average  share
of privately held national wealth) or in  terms of a series  of particu-
lar  situations,  equally  objectively  described  (e.g.,  being  diabetic
and lacking insulin for  an overdue  shot).  Alternatively,  we  can  im-
agine  an  official body  administering  a  much vaguer and  more  sub-
jective standard  (e.g.,  being needy is having  so  little that  a person
of good  conscience  would  feel  guilty  about  your  state  of depriva-
tion, supposing the deprivation was  not your fault).
We  have  cast our five  arguments  in  terms  of comparisons  be-
tween  PP  and  SON or  FSN.  In  each  case we  compare  the valued
experiences  generated,  or sometimes  the hours worked,  under  the
various regimes. 7 But we have set aside  all arguments  that refer to
the good  (or ill) that may be wrought  by, or ascribed  to,  the mere
existence  of property  rights.  It  might  be  that  because  people  be-
lieve  that property  is  right  or  fair,  they  will  stop  working  under
SON  or  FSN,  whether  out  of depression  or  a  desire  to  bring  a
property regime into existence.  Moreover,  it is  of course  true  that
if people  want property  for its own  sake,  irrespective  of its impact
7.  We  have  construed  the  several  arguments  for  property  as  all  designed  to
show  that  property  is  relatively  efficient  by  the  test variously  known  as  "Kaldor-
Hicks,"  or "hypothetical  compensation,"  or "potential  Pareto  superiority"-4.e.,  that
property  will generate  a higher-valued  periodic total  output of goods,  services,  and
leisure  for the members  of society taken altogether  than  will any  alternative  regime.
Some  economists  may  object  that  such  is  not  the  sense  in which  they  ordinarily
speak  of "efficiency;"  that in calling a regime  "efficient"  a careful  economist would
mean  only that it was a  "Pareto optimum,"  an arrangement  that could not be altered
without worsening the lot of at least one person;  that, indeed, comparison  of regimes
in terms of total values across society is meaningless  without an  objective,  or at least
intelligible,  metric  for comparing one  person's gain  with another's  loss; that the only
such  metric known  is  that of (actual  or constructed)  offer or asking  prices,  which  is
unsatisfactory  because  it  suppresses  the  important  but  unfathomable  effects  of
changes  in distribution  on the total of individual welfare levels.
Our response is,  first, that the strict criterion  of actual  Pareto  superiority-better
for each person,  or at least as good-cannot be the one intended by claims  that prop-
erty is  relatively  efficient, because  it is plain  without argument  that the  strict crite-
rion cannot select among PP, SON, and FSN; second, that a great deal  of policy  anal-
ysis,  as  distinguished  from work in economic theory, in  fact aims,  if only mediately,
at maximization of social welfare  by  way of "educated  guesses"  about cross-personal
welfare comparisons;  third, that if we succeed with our project of showing that PP is
not demonstrably  more efficient than  SON or FSN in the less demanding "potential"
sense,  we  shall  also  have  shown,  a  fortiori  (supposing  any  such  showing  were
needed),  that PP is not efficient vis-a-vis  the alternatives in the strict Paretian  sense;
and, finally, that the nature of our attacks on the economic arguments  for property  is
such  that specification  of output  metrics is  not crucial  for  us: in  some instances,  the
arguments  we are attacking will imply their own  metrics  (e.g., total labor time  in  the
case of the First Argument);  in  others, our position  holds no  matter what metric you
choose  to  consider-offer/asking  prices  ("wealth"),  labor  time,  product  output  by
weight, utiles, whatever.
[Vol.  8:711
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on hov  many  valued  experiences  of other  kinds  they have,  then
people  will be  worse  off under  an  alternative  regime.  Finally,  it
may  be  that  property  is  a  good  or  right  arrangement  on  grounds
having nothing to  do with  the volume or distribution of valued ex-
periences.  Because we  are  specifically  interested here in exploring
the  economic,  instrumental  virtues  of  property,  we  suppose
throughout that none of these is the case:  people,  we assume,  want
or don't want a property regime  because of its impact,  as a means,
on  their  supply  of goods,  services,  and  leisure;  and  property  is
good  or right (bad or wrong) just insofar as it is (is not) truly such a
means.
A.  First  Argument for PP: Security Increases Production
In both  SON  and FSN no one  can  expect with certainty  to be
able  to  retain  the  fruits  of her  labor.  It follows,  according  to  the
First Argument,  that people will not work as much  as under condi-
tions  of legally  guaranteed  security.8  Economists  will  be  quick  to
point  out that showing-if one  could-that people  will work more
under property  than under  SON  or FSN would not by itself estab-
lish  that  property  is  the  Pareto-superior  regime.  Variables  other
than products  of labor (e.g.,  leisure,  security) enter into  individual
welfare levels.  Moreover,  products  of labor are themselves  a practi-
cally infinite set of possibilities  all having different values. Thus  the
highest valued  goods  might,  for  all the First Argument has  to  say,
be in  better  supply  under  SON  or FSN  than  under property.  An
adequately  formed  argument  for property's  efficiency,  the  econo-
mists  might continue,  would  be designed  to  show that property  is
the  regime  most likely to  generate  the  highest valued mix  of out-
puts  in  which  various  products  of labor  are  but possible  compo-
nents.  All  of that  is,  of course,  correct.  We  deal  below  with  the
more  adequately  formed  arguments  for property.  Here  our  objec-
tive  is  the narrower  one of showing  that the First Argument  is not
only  incomplete  but  false  in  itself-that,  from  the  postulate  of ra-
tional  maximizing  behavior,  it  does  not follow  that  the  volume  of
productive labor will in even the rawest sense be higher under prop-
erty than under SON  or FSN.
There  are  two  mistakes  in  the  First Argument.  The first, par-
ticularly relevant to  SON,  is  that it confuses  the legal "permission"
of violence  and chaos with the actual social practice  of violence  and
8.  R.  POSNER, supra  note  5,  §  3.1, at 27-28; see W.  BLACKSTONE,  supra note  4,
at *4.
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chaos.  Even if no  one has any  legal right to protection,  and every-
one is  legally entitled  to  do  anything  they want and  can  get  away
with, it does  not follow  that among rational maximizers  there must
arise either random  depredations  or actual freedom  to refrain  from
production. There  might,  in SON,  evolve  a balance  of physical  and
social  force  such  that both the  "weak"  and the  "strong"  have very
distinct  ideas  about what will  probably  happen  to them  if they do
or don't  produce.  And the  particular,  highly  discernible  pattern of
force  might be  one that  induces  the  population  as  a whole  to pro-
duce more rather than less than they would under PP.
In  a  two person SON,  for  example,  the  stronger  won't neces-
sarily kill  the weaker.  The stronger may be more  interested  in the
consumption  of products  of labor  than  in  perfect  safety  or  in  ag-
gression  for its  own sake.  Even according to  the usual,  very pessi-
mistic  models  of human  nature9  used  in  this kind  of analysis,  the
stronger  in that  case  will rather  force  the weaker to work,  and ex-
tract  from  him  as  much  surplus  as  is  compatible  with  stability.  It
might very well be that he would impose something  analogous  to  a
tax  on  everything  except  what  the weaker  needed  to  survive  at  a
level  that permitted  the  kind  of production  the  stronger  desired.
There  is  no  reason  to  expect  this  arrangement  to  generate  great
"uncertainty."  The weaker would  know pretty well what to  expect
and so would the stronger.
To be  sure,  the weaker  may  receive  less  return  for  his labor
than  under  a two-person  property  regime,  while  the  stronger  re-
ceives  a  large  income without  working at all.  But  the  weaker's in-
centive  to work will not necessarily  be  lessened by the  low return
to  labor.  The  stronger  may  force  him,  by  threatening  him  with
even  less palatable  alternatives,  to work more hours for less  return
than he would in a property regime.  As for the stronger,  he  is pro-
vided  by the weaker with  a steady  flow of products,  but there  are
two  reasons  why  he  may  also  work  more  than  under  property.
First,  he must supervise  and  direct the  weaker,  and the  return to
supervision  may be very high.  Second,  he may  choose to spend his
time producing,  of his  own free  will,  "luxuries"  that he  prefers  to
leisure,  given  that his "necessities"  have been otherwise supplied.
Of course,  this picture  of an  industrious  state  of nature  is  no
more  logically  necessary than that  which is  usually implicit  in  eco-
nomic  discussions  of property.  It  might  also  work  out  that  the
stronger  adopted  a  policy  of putting  in  only  enough  supervision
9.  E.g.,  T. HOBBES,  LEVIATHAN ch. 11  (1651).
(Vol.  8: 711
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time  to  make  the  weaker  work,  say,  two  hours  a  day,  but
systematically  confiscated  all  surplus  over  subsistence  the  weaker
produced "in his free time."  The weaker might respond by working
two hours  for the stronger,  two  hours  for his  subsistence,  and  not
at all in the "free  time."  In this possible scenario,  SON might well
generate less  labor than PP.
We have thus far assumed both that all property regimes  gen-
erate  the same incentives  to produce,  and that a given property re-
gime yields  the same incentives in all circumstances.  But it is obvi-
ous  that how much people produce varies  both  as among particular
property  regimes  and  according  to the  actual  distribution  of rights
within  a  given  regime.  If one  rich person  has  property  in  all  the
means of production and  the rest of the people have  property only
in  their  labor,  then  it  is  very  possible-though  not  certain-that
the  total  hours  worked  will be  greater  than  in  our  "industrious"
state of nature.  The picture  grows  cloudy if we  suppose a  different
distribution  of land  and  capital,  or  some  set  of legal  rules  (e.g.,
maximum  hours  laws)  that  destroys  the  bargaining  power  of  the
rich man even when he is formally the "owner"  of all capital goods
and land.
The  second objection  to  the First Argument,  relevant  to  both
SON  and  FSN,  is  that even  if holdings  and harvests  are  more  se-
cure  under  PP  than  SON  and  FSN,  people  may  respond  to  the
hazards  of  the  latter  regimes  by  working  more  rather  than  less.
Under  the  chancy,  non-property  regimes  people  are  doubtful
whether they will enjoy the fruits of their productive  undertakings,
so the  reward  for each unit of work or investment  is  less,  ex ante,
than  it would  be  under property.  Because  the  reward  is  less,  ac-
cording  to  the  First Argument,  they will  work less.  The objection
is  that reducing the probable  share of product retained by the pro-
ducer  may  induce  people  to work more  rather than less,  in order
to maintain  the same level of welfare-from-consumption.  For exam-
ple,  a farmer  may respond  to  the  threat  of theft by planting more
crops,  in  the  hope  that  he  can  thereby  offset  depredations  and
keep  his income up-with the result of increasing the consumption
of society  as  a whole,  the  thieves  included.  In  technical  terms,  it
all depends  on  the  relation between  the  income  and  the  substitu-
tion effects  of the reduced rewards from work. 10
The  argument  that  property  has  desirable  effects  on  produc-
10.  See J. HENDERSON  & R. QUANDT,  MICROECONOMIC  THEORY  §  2-6  (2d ed.
1971).
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tive  effort thus  amounts  to no more  than  an  empirical  assertion.  It
remains  such  when  we  take  into  account  that people who  live  off
the work  of others  in  the  state  of nature  or  in  a  regime  of forced
sharing  might have  to work  for their livings  under  a property  re-
gime (though they might,  too,  live on voluntary  charity).  The ques-
tion  whether  adding  their product,  if any,  would  overcome  what-
ever  reduction  in  product  might  be  caused  by  giving  people
greater security can be resolved only by looking at the circumstances
of particular cases.
B.  Second Argument for PP.  Theft is Inefficient
Suppose  a  thief takes  something,  in  the  SON,  that the  thief
would willingly have paid only five dollars  for in PP, while the pos-
sessor would have  offered  ten  dollars  to the thief at the moment  of
theft,  if it had been  possible  thereby  to bind the  thief not to  steal
the  object.  It  is  a  common  intuition  that it  is  somehow  not  eco-
nomically sound to let the  theft happen under these circumstances.
It  is,  one might  think, inefficient  because  the  law  is  sanctioning  a
change  that makes one person worse off (the possessor,  by ten dol-
lars) while making another better off by considerably less (the thief,
by five dollars).1 ,
The argument that theft is inefficient plainly depends on an as-
sumption  of  substantial  transaction  costs,  which  in  turn  imports
motivational  assumptions  regarding  individual  wants  and  proclivi-
ties,  not at all implicit in  the bare postulate  of rational  maximizing
behavior.  If there  are no  transaction  costs,  there will be  no theft,
even without  the  coercive  legal institution  of property,  unless  the
property  is worth more  to  the thief than  to the victim.  Otherwise,
the  possessor  will  offer  the  thief some  sum  to  go  away,  they  will
negotiate,  and strike  a  bargain  in which  the  thief receives  some-
thing  between  five  and  ten  dollars  in  exchange  for desisting.  The
end result is  that the prior possession  is  respected  but the posses-
sor  ends  up,  say,  out  $9.95,  rather than  the  $10  value  of the  ob-
ject,  while  the  thief  ends  up  pocketing  $9.95  rather  than  what
would  have  been  (for him) $5.00  worth  of stolen goods.  The  only
11.  See R.  POSNER,  supra note 5, § 3.5, at 40-41  & n.1; id. § 6.1,  at  121.  In this
discussion  we  abstract from  "offer/asking  problems"  that arise  in  situations  of this
kind.  See,  e.g.,  Baker,  The  Ideology  of  the Economic Analysis  of  Law,  5  PHI-
LOSOPHY  &  PuB.  AFF.  3,  12-22  (1975);  Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can
Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8  HOFSTRA  L. REV.  671,  679-81  (1980);  Kennedy,
CostlBenefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems-A Critique, 33 STAN.  L. REV.  (Jan.
1981)  (forthcoming).
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difference  between  this  outcome  and  the  one  that  would  have
occurred  under a property regime is  "distributional."  The object is
finally  allocated to the same use (unless the possessor's  impoverish-
ment causes  him to change  that use).  Some are better off and some
worse  off than  they  would  have  been  under  PP, but  we  cannot
rank either outcome  as Pareto superior to the other.
Let  us,  however,  grant  arguendo  that  substantial  transaction
costs  are  an  inevitable  accompaniment  of essential  human  nature.
The theft,  then,  may well occur in SON but not in  PP, apparently
leaving  society  $5  poorer  in  SON.  On  the  other hand,  transaction
costs  also  disrupt the  functioning  of a  PP regime.'2  For example,
transaction  costs in PP may prevent the transfer of an object from a
possessor  who  values  it  at  $5  to  another  who  values  it  at  $10;
whereas  in  SON,  the  other  might  simply  take  the  object. 13  For
ought the rationality postulate  can tell us,  the disruption in PP may
on  the  whole  be more  damaging  to wealth  or welfare  than that  in
SON.  We  cannot  say  a  priori  which  way  the  balance  of systemic
advantage  lies.
The problem  is  further  complicated  by  obscurity  in  the  rela-
tionship  between  dollar  evaluations  and  real  satisfaction  levels.
Suppose,  again,  that in  SON  but not in  PP  a  theft will  occur that
costs  the  victim  $10  while the thief gains  only  $5.  Obviously,  one
cannot  say that either the  SON  or the  PP result is  Pareto superior
in  the  strictest  sense  of better  for both  parties.  Nor  can  one  say
with assurance  that the  PP result is  "socially" preferred.  The dollar
figures  are  supposed  to  represent  sums  of money  the  parties  re-
spectively would  be willing to  exchange  for the  object  in question,
not  the  absolute  (interpersonally  comparable)  amounts  of  satisfac-
tion possession would bring them.  So if the initial possessor is very
rich  and  the  thief  is  very  poor,  an  observor  might  feel  that  the'
theft probably results  in a net gain in total satisfaction-since, given
the  standard  assumption  of diminishing  marginal  utility  of wealth,
a  dollar  means  relatively  less  to  the  possessor  than to  the  thief.'4
The concept of efficiency  does tell us  that as between  the theft
and  a  deal  in  which  the  possessor  pays  the  thief to  desist,  we
12.  See pp. 726-29 infra.
13.  This  is the  economic rationale  for the SON-like  practice  of uncompensated
governmental  impairments  of private  holdings  by  regulation  and  "injurious  affec-
tion."  See generally Michelman,  Property, Utility, and Fairness:  Comments on the
Ethical Foundations  of "Just  Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.  L. REV.  1165 (1967).
14.  Such  a  probabilistic  judgment need  entail  no  direct  interpersonal  utility
comparisons. See  A.  LERNER,  ECONOMICS  OF CONTROL  23-40  (1944).
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should prefer the latter.  If the possessor and the thief can  agree on
a bribe,  both will be better off (according to  their own  evaluations
of the  matter)  than if the  theft  actually  occurs.  From  this we  can
infer  that  if there  were  no  property,  it  would  be  inefficient  to
criminalize  the  exaction  of a payment  to  prevent the  theft.  But  as
between  the theft and respect for the property without a bribe, we
cannot say that either alternative  makes  both parties' prospects,  or
the  total  of their  prospects,  better  than  the  other  does.  In  other
words,  efficiency provides no basis for choosing between them.
C.  Third Argument for PP: PP Reduces Uncertainty
The  third  argument  for  PP is  that SON  and  FSN  involve  an
unpleasant  psychological  state of anxiety  about whether  or not one
will be  able  to keep  what  one has  and  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of one's
labor.  Since  this anxiety is  a psychic "bad,"  we can make everyone
better off by eliminating it through a property regime. 15 This argu-
ment looks like the argument that people will not work  in SON be-
cause of uncertainty  about  receiving the  fruits  of their labor, 1 '  but
it is  in fact quite different.  The previous  argument  focused  on pro-
duction  incentives;  the  only  significance  of uncertainty  there  was
that it modified  the return  to productive  activity.  Here  the  notion
is that if everyone  dislikes uncertainty,  then we can  make everyone
better  off  by  moving  from  SON  or  FSN  to  a  property  regime
specified in  such a way  that everyone  would expect  to  receive  ex-
actly the  same quantum  of goods  and leisure,  and  to do  exactly  as
much  work,  as  in  the  SON  or  FSN  alternative.  The  difference
would  be  that  under  PP  people  would  receive  their  rewards
through transactions  based on preexisting  sets  of entitlements;  and
everyone,  supposedly,  would  enjoy  her  receipts  more,  knowing
they were accruing as a matter of secure legal right.
The  basic response  to  the  argument  that property  maximizes
the  psychic  good  of certainty  is  that,  under  all  three  regimes,  to
enhance  certainty for one person  is to impair  certainty for another.
Under  a  property  regime  people  are  all  certain  that they  and  no
one  else will  receive  the  fruits  of their labor,  but all  uncertain  of
access  to  the fruits  of others'  labor.  In moving from  one regime  to
another,  some  will  have  gained  security  at the  expense  of others,
and  everyone  will  have  traded  certainty  and  uncertainty  of  one
kind for certainty and uncertainty of another.
15.  J. BENTHAM,  THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION  111-14 (Ogden ed.  1931).
16.  See pp. 717-20 supra.
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1.  The  Certainty of a Property Regime  Vis-a-Vis  the  State of
Nature-In the  state of nature,  the  strong are certain  that no auto-
matic,  irresistible  force  will  stop  them  from  exploiting  the  weak.
Thus  secure in the knowledge  of their strength,  they are  certain of
receiving  benefits  they  cannot  be  as  certain  of receiving  under
property.  This is  true  even if the property regime  is based on par-
ticular rules  and  an  initial  distribution  of rights  that are  designed
ex  ante to  yield  for the  strong  the  same  shares  they would expect
in a  state of nature. The move  to property may  impair their secu-
rity even so,  because the whole point of a property regime is to re-
strain  the  strong  from  resorting  to  their strength  if it  should  turn
out  ex  post,  through  the  play  of socially  uncontrollable  chance-
like  freakish  weather-that  their  shares  are  less  than  probabil-
istically anticipated.
The  shift  in the  types  and  distribution  of uncertainty  will be
complicated  for  all  parties.  Under PP,  the  strong  need  no  longer
rely  on  their  continuing  strength,  because  the  state  will  protect
their  shares  even  if they  become  weak.  The  weak  are  no  longer
vulnerable  to  unrestrained  depredations,  and  they  now  have  the
chance  of becoming  rich  without  becoming  strong,  but they  have
lost  all  prospects  of gaining  power  through  force  themselves,  by
using  the  strength  of their numbers,  for example.  If the weak  be-
come  the  poor,  as  Rousseau  would  have  it, 17  and  the  strong  the
rich,  then  the  weak  will  have  disarmed  themselves,  unless,  of
course,  universal suffrage  comes along with property, in which case
it would  appear that the strong/rich  have  made  a big  mistake;  un-
less,  of course,  there  is  a constitution  and judicial  review;  and  so
forth.
The more  one speculates  about the multiple  changes  in expec-
tations  generated  by the  shift from  the  state of nature  to a  regime
of property,  the  less  clear it is what  might be meant by the  argu-
ment  about  the  psychic  good  of certainty.  The  only  thing  that  is
certain  to  be certain  under property  is  effective  protection  of the
weak  against  violent  dispossession  by  the  strong,  and  vice  versa.
Yet  in  the  state  of nature  there  is  an exactly  equivalent  certainty
that  no  absolutely  dominant  force  will  intervene  to  frustrate  the
dispossessing  strong.  Depending  on  their  initial  positions,  their
preferences,  and  their ideas  about  likely  courses  of events,  some
people may prefer one kind of certainty,  others the other kind.
17.  J.  ROUSSEAU,  What is  the Origin of Inequality Among  Men, and is it Au-
thorized by Natural  Law?, in  THE SOCIAL  CONTRACT  AND  DISCOURSEs  249-52 (1950
ed.).
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This point  does not depend  on  defining the  state of nature  as
in  itself  a  "regime  of  entitlements,"  though  some  people  find  it
easier  to understand when put that way. 18 When there  is  an estab-
lished legal rule  that one person  can inflict injury  on another  with-
out paying compensation,  we often speak of the injuror having a le-
gal "right" to  act as he does.  And  such rights  are "property" within
the broad definition usually used, for example,  in  constitutional  ad-
judication.  Thus  one company  can  deliberately  injure  another,  say
by  price  cutting,  in  the  exercise  of normal  legal  liberties.  More-
over,  the  victim  is  free  to  resist,  say  by  retaliatory  price  cut-
ting,  and that is also a matter  of legal "right."  (Of course,  there are
many restrictions  on both the right to injure and the right to retali-
ate.  It is  illegal for one company  to put another  out  of business by
burning its premises.)
One  way  to  understand  the  state  of nature  is  as  a  regime  in
which  all  the  rights  to  be  "secure"  have  been  abolished,  leaving
only freedom of action,  both  to injure and to  resist injury. 19 Like  a
regime  of property,  this  is  a  situation  of  formal  equality  within
which  the  substantive outcome-the  set of welfare  positions  every-
one  will  reach  as  a  result  of  activity  within  the  framework-is
highly uncertain.  There  is  no reason  to  believe,  a priori  or on  the
basis  of the  postulate  of rational  maximizing,  that  one  regime  is
Pareto  superior to the other, even "potentially."
2.  The Certainty of Property  Vis-a-Vis Forced Sharing-If  what
we have been  saying about the certainty argument in the context of
the state of nature  is true, then it should be plain that certainty  ar-
guments  won't work any better  against  forced  sharing.  If what  we
are  interested  in  is  the  certainty  provided  by  law,  then  forced
sharing  is  a legal  regime,  by  any  definition,  just like  property.  It
should provide no more  and no less  certainty than  any  other set of
rules and standards about the application  of public force.
If, on the other hand,  we are  concerned with people's  sense of
confidence  that  their expectations  about  substantive  outcomes  will
be fulfilled,  then  life under forced  sharing  will  be differently  cer-
tain and uncertain  than life under property.  Forced sharing ties the
fortunes  of  the  individual  to  the  group.  It  therefore  eliminates
some fundamental  uncertainties  of a property regime.  Under FSN,
one need not fear that one's own  unproductiveness  will expose  one
18.  See pp. 759-62 infra.
19.  See pp. 754-55 infra.
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to  isolated  deprivation  as  long  as  others  are  producing. 20  But
forced  sharing introduces  its own forms  of insecurity,  since the  for-
tunes  of  the  group  depend  on  a  complex  process  of  interaction,
with no guarantees  against  a disastrous  slide into uncooperative  be-
havior.
As  we  did  in  the  comparison  with  the  state  of nature,  we
might illustrate possible impacts  of forced sharing on different sorts
of people.  But  at  this  point  perhaps  an  analogy  is  enough:  those
who are  "good at production" under private property,  or who have
large holdings  of property, would obviously  have more to fear from
forced  sharing  than  those  who  are  weak  producers  and  have  no
property. They  are analogous  to "the strong" in  the state of nature,
who  have  a  lot  to  lose  from  a  property  regime.  But  the  gainers
from  property are  like  the  strong  in that they  are also vulnerable,
in  a  property  regime,  to  mischance  that  leaves  them  in  need,
whereas under forced sharing they would not be.
Again,  we  need  to  separate  the  uncertainty  argument  from
that about substantive  gains and losses.  Suppose  a property regime
in which for a time the balance of skill at production and the distri-
bution  of inherited  wealth  leads  to  a  situation  of exactly  equal  in-
comes.  A  move  to  forced  sharing  would  then  present  everyone
with  a  choice between  the  two  forms  of certainty  and uncertainty
we ,have already mentioned.  Some would jump at the chance to re-
duce  the  precariousness  of their  position  under  property,  where
mischance  may  leave  them in need.  Others would not want to  sac-
rifice  the  chance  of bettering their  positions  in  the  next round  of
bargaining under property. The only  thing that's  clear is  that noth-
ing  is  clear  about  the  impact  of the  change  on  total  welfare.  The
notion  of uncertainty  is  not,  by itself, enough  to allow us  to make
even  a guess about the  outcome.
As  with the  First Argument,  we can  anticipate  a complaint by
economists  that our discussion  misses the true point of suggestions
that a property  regime  might  minimize  uncertainty.  Of course,  it
will  be said,  no regime  can  be externally  known  to  contain  "less,"
or  less  obnoxious,  uncertainty  than  any other,  partly  because  the
value  of uncertainty  is  impenetrably,  individualistically  subjective.
Just  because  that  is  so,  the  objection  continues,  the  only  way  to
20.  See R.  Musgrave,  The Role of Social Insurance in an Overall Program  for
Social Welfare, in THE AMERICAN  SYSTEM  OF  SOCIAL-INSURANCE  23 (W. Brown  ed.
1968).
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optimize  on  uncertainty  is  to  facilitate  consensual  reallocation  of
risk  through  voluntary  transactions-insurance,  futures  and  re-
quirements  contracts,  liquidated  damages  clauses,  and  so  on;  and
the  virtue  claimed  for  property  is  just  that it  does  facilitate  such
voluntary  exchange  of risk,  quite as it facilitates voluntary  exchange
of other  goods  and  bads.  Our  answer  is  the  same  as  before:  the
more  adequately  formed arguments  for property's  economic virtue
are considered  below.21  Here  we have been  dealing with  the  less
sophisticated  claim  that property directly reduces-as distinguished
from  facilitating  private  transactions  that  reduce-the  amount  of
disvalued uncertainty,  relative  to SON and FSN.
D.  Fourth  Argument for PP: Coordinational  Failure
The  Fourth Argument  for  PP is  that  life  under  SON  or FSN
will  be  an  organizational  nightmare,  whereas  coordination  under
property will be  easily  managed.22 The  objection  to  this argument
is that it simply misunderstands  the organizational  problem: in fact,
both SON  and  FSN could pose  insuperable  strategic  and  transac-
tion  cost  obstacles,  but  are  no  more  likely to  do  so than  is  PP,  if
all  we  have  as  a  basis  for  prediction  is  the  postulate  of rational
maximizing.  Furthermore,  while  PP might  keep  us  out  of coordi-
national  quagmires,  it might also  turn out to be one itself. In  other
words,  rather  than  the  postulate  of rational  maximizing  allowing
us  to  predict  that  PP  will  make  everyone  better  off  than  they
would  be  under  either  SON  or  FSN,  the  postulate  indicates  that
each  of the  three  regimes  might  or  might  not  be  organization-
ally  disastrous,  depending  on the  particular proclivities  and factual
circumstances  of the people involved.
1.  The  Coordination Problem in FSN-In the  state  of forced
sharing,  each  person's  level  of  welfare  is  directly  dependent  on
each  other person's.  The  question  is  whether  the  people  involved
will  respond to  this  situation by  working a  lot or by working  only
very little, in  each case  by comparison to  the property regime.  (As
with  the  First Argument,  we  here  grant arguendo  that  less work
means  less total satisfaction.)  They might work  only a little,  if each
person  expected others  to work a lot, and  hoped to be  able  to en-
21.  See pp.  729-39 infra. For a  refutation  of the  analogous justification  of en-
forceable contract,  see pp. 744-45 infra.
22.  E.g.,  Hardin, supra note  6.  For a  good discussion of the general  subject  of
coordination  problems, see Heymann, The Problem of Coordination:  Bargaining  and
Rules, 86 HARv.  L. REV.  797 (1973).
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joy a share without working himself. The law does not prevent this
outcome,  and  it intervenes  positively  to  prevent  the  others  from
punishing the freeloader by denying him his "needed" share of the
labor of others.
There  is  a  way,  however,  for  the  group  to  sanction  the  free-
loader:  if everyone  cuts  back  work,  then  the  freeloader  will  find
himself at a low level of welfare.  If everyone  decides  to live  off the
labor  of others,  everyone  will  starve.  When  everyone  is  starving,
either there will be a group  reaction  to reverse  the slide,  or there
will not be.  In  other words,  the  state  of forced  sharing  can  easily
be conceptualized  as a strategic game,  in which the structure  of in-
centives  is ambiguous.
As  is  generally  the  case  with  games  of  this  kind,  our  best
guess  about  the  outcome  depends  on  the  precise  assumptions  we
make about  the  situation.23  In a  small  group,  with  easy  communi-
cation and much mutual knowledge and trust, it is more likely that
a  cooperative  solution  will  occur  and will  persist;  if everyone  has
the same  capacity  for  work,  the  agreement  process  will be  easier;
and so  on.  The only  general  point of importance  for us  is  that the
bare  postulate  of rational  maximizing  behavior  tells  us little  about
the outcome.  It is possible to flesh  out the  situation so that people
work  a great  deal,  more  than under  many imaginable property  re-
gimes; and it is possible to construct it so  that they end by working
less.
2.  The  Coordination Problem in  SON-Just as  in  FSN,  in
SON  each  person's  welfare  is  dependent  on  each  other  person's,
but here  the  interdependence  is  brought  about  by the  absence  of
self-enforcing  rules,  rather  than  by  irresistible  enforcement  of
sharing. Again the question is how things will go when people real-
ize  that  they  can  steal  what  they  are  strong,  shrewd,  and  swift
enough  to get away with.  It is  easy to imagine  a situation in which
some  give  up work,  and  subsist on  meager  gains by stealing  from
those who  continue working,  while  the workers  have  to  invest  so
much  time and  energy in precautions  that they are not much  bet-
ter off than the freeloaders.  It is even possible to imagine that peo-
ple  will  become  so  preoccupied  with  defense  of the  products  of
their  labor  that  they  will  take  to  launching  preemptive  strikes
against  one  another,  and  that  the  world  will  be  ceaselessly  em-
broiled  in  lethal  conflict.  Or  we might foresee  the  gradual  deple-
23.  See generally A. RAPOPORT  & A. CHAMMA-,  PRISONER's  DILEMMA  (1965).
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tion  through  overuse of the world's scarce,  but  unowned resources
until the race simply dies out.
But,  as  we  saw  in  considering  the  First Argument  for  private
property,  there is nothing inevitable  about such a slide into mutual
self-destruction.  It is  quite  imaginable  that a single  Amazon  might
emerge  who was  strong  enough  to force  everyone  to work  all  the
time,  so that,  far from  discoordination,  we had  a situation  of con-
tinuous,  centrally  directed  labor.  Or  the  people  involved  might
achieve  through nonbinding agreements and informal arrangements
many of the benefits of property,  while avoiding many of the draw-
backs  of rights relentlessly enforced.
As  with FSN,  a lot depends  on  particular  aspects  of the  SON
we  are  imagining-things  like  the  number  of people,  the  ease  of
communication,  the  existence  of  powerful  family,  tribal,  or  local
groups  with internally  effective  norms  of cooperation  and some  set
of practices  for  dealing with  "others."  If all we know is  that people
are rational  maximizers,  we  cannot  say that  they will  or that they
will not manage to prevent the slide into chaos.
3.  The  Coordination Problem in PP-In a  complex  economic
system,  with  extensive  division  of labor  and  little  production  for
autoconsumption,  the economic  process  as  a whole  requires  an  ex-
traordinary  amount of social  cooperation.  If everyone  has  property
in  his labor,  and if property  in  the means of production  is widely
dispersed,  this  cooperation  requires  great  numbers  of  complex
chains  of bargains  among  individual  right  holders,  and  these  bar-
gains  will be costly  to  organize  and vulnerable  to strategic  failure.
The situation  under  property  may be a  "prisoners'  dilemma"  such
that  each  owner  rationally  pursuing  his  view  of his  own  interest
will behave  antisocially.  For example,  every  owner  may withdraw
his property  from production  because  of fear of economic  collapse,
and  thereby  fulfill  as  fact  what  began  as  only  prophecy.  If there
were no transaction  costs,  each property owner would  see that the
sum  of all  the  individual  exercises  of rights  was  a  social  disaster,
and the  group could  strike a bargain  to keep production  going. But
the  atomization  of control  might make  such  a solution  impossible.
By  contrast,  a  single  "strong  man"  who  controlled  the  whole
economy  might avert the disaster by forcing everyone  to behave  in
the  socially  appropriate  fashion.  Likewise,  communal  ownership
might result in "planning" that prevented crisis.
The point,  then,  is  not that some  or any property  regime  can
never  be  superior  on  efficiency  grounds  to  the  state  of  nature.
Rather,  if there  are  no  transaction  costs  preventing  bargaining,
[Vol. 8: 711
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each regime  is necessarily  efficient,  in the  sense of Pareto  optimal
(on the  production-possibility  frontier),  whereas  in  the presence  of
transaction  costs  the  question  of  efficiency  is  an  empirical  one.
Given  transaction  costs,  it may  be  that  people  in  SON  would  be
blocked  from moving to a property regime that would  unleash such
a  flood  of  commodities  that  the  gainers  could  compensate  the
strong  for  their  losses.  But  it  might  also  work  the  other  way
around:  the dispersal of control among property holders  might pre-
vent  the  strong  from  reorganizing  production  along  lines  that
would  produce  enormous  surpluses,  which  would  in  turn  permit
the strong to buy off the weak.
E.  Fifth Argument for PP: Distribution  of
the Tradeoff Between Work and Leisure
We  have  now  arrived  at  the  argument  for  private  property
that  seems  most  plausible  to  people  who  have  some  technical
knowledge  of  economics.  It  is  that  a  property  regime  maximizes
welfare  because  it  provides  individuals  with  both  the  information
and  motivation  they require  to  make  the  choices  among  different
kinds  of work and investment,  and between work and leisure,  that
will  allow  the  group  to  get  the  maximum  of satisfaction  from  the
resources available  to  them.  One form  of the argument is  to  assert
that departures  from private property  always cause a "distortion"  of
incentives. 24  The  distortion  argument  is  complex,  and in  order to
address it we will have  to elaborate  our model of a property regime
considerably beyond what has been necessary up  to this point.
1.  The Crusoe Economy-The idea that underlies  the "distor-
tion"  argument  is  that  of the  single  producer  on  a desert  island
who  "owns"  both  his  own  labor  and  a  defined  set  of natural  re-
sources,  simply  because there  is  no one  else  around to  make  con-
flicting claims.  This solitary producer will spend some time at work
and  some  time  not  working.  The  postulate  of  rational  max-
imizing  behavior  is  helpful  in  figuring out what particular  division
he will make between the two uses  of time.  He will work until the
psychic  rewards  of another unit of work fall below those of a unit of
leisure.  In  equilibrium he will arrange  things  so that the  marginal
yield of utility from work and leisure  is equal.
He  will  follow  the  same  procedure  in  deciding what  to  work
on.  In equilibrium,  the marginal  yield of a further minute  spent on
24.  See  Lange,  On the Economic Theory of Socialism, in ECONOMIC  FOUNDA-
TIONS, supra note 1, at 69-75.
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shelter  will exactly  equal  that of a minute spent on food  gathering.
These marginal  equalities  guarantee that Crusoe is getting the most
possible satisfaction  out of both his time and his resources.  There is
a quite real  sense in which the actual quantities  of work of different
kinds,  and  of leisure,  that  Crusoe  chooses  are "natural."  They  re-
flect  the  natural  surround  of  physical  resources,  and  Crusoe's "nature,"  in  the  sense  in which  nature  means  simply a  set of pre-
ferences.
2.  The Multiple-Crusoe  Economy-The next  step in the devel-
opment  of the  distortion  argument  is  to  imagine  a  multiplicity
of  islands,  each  different  from  the  others,  each  with  a  different
Crusoe  on it.  At first,  the Crusoes  are ignorant  of each  others'  ex-
istence.  Each  behaves  as  though  he  were  the  only  person  in  the
world, producing  in such a way  as to generate  marginal  equality of
satisfactions  from  different kinds of work,  and from the mix of work
and leisure. Then they become aware of one anothers' existence.
Let's suppose  they respond to  this knowledge  by agreeing that
each  Crusoe  will  "own"  his  island,  and  by  creating  a  state  to  en-
force  their property  regime.  Each will  continue  to  produce  as  be-
fore,  except now there is  the possibility of trade and the division  of
labor.  Imagine  a  first  phase  of  trade  in  resources  only.  Two
Crusoes  discover  that  each  would  prefer  the  other's  island  to  his
own.  That is,  given the first Crusoe's  preferences  and his capacities
for  labor  and  leisure,  he  would  prefer  to  own  the  second's  island
rather than his  own; and vice versa for the second Crusoe.  A round
of trading  of islands  ensues,  until  there  is no trade left that anyone
wants  to  make.  On  each  island,  the  Crusoe  owner  produces  until
the marginal  equalities  are achieved.
If we  suppose  that  the  trading  of finished  products  is  pre-
cluded  for  some  reason  that does  not interfere  with  the  trading  of
islands,  this new situation  is efficient  in the sense of representing  a
Pareto  optimum.  It  is  not possible  to  make  any  Crusoe  better off
without  injuring  some  other  Crusoe.  We  could  make  any  Crusoe
better  off,  say,  by  allowing  him  to  enslave  another,  or  by  giving
him  two  islands  instead  of one.  But  this  would  presumably  harm
the  Crusoe  who  was  enslaved  or  dispossessed.  As  things  stand,
each  Crusoe is  making  the  most of his resources;  nothing  is  being
"wasted;"  each  Crusoe  is as well off as it is  possible for him  to be,
given  the  initial  distribution  of islands,  of physical  characteristics,
and of preferences.
It  would  be  misleading  to  describe  as  "natural"  the  various
quantities  of different kinds of work and of leisure that the Crusoes
(Vol.  8:711
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are now  doing. These amounts  depend on what island each Crusoe
has,  and this in turn  depends  on the  initial distribution.  This  is  an
important point, which  we can illustrate  as  follows.  Suppose three
Crusoes and three islands, with the Crusoes'  rankings as follows:
A prefers  1 to 2 and 2 to 3
B prefers  1 to 2 and 2 to 3
C prefers  1 to 3 and 3 to 2
Initial distribution  I:
A gets  1
B gets 2
C gets 3
Result: no trades
Initial  distribution  II:
A gets  1
B gets 3
C gets 2
Result: A keeps  1;  B gets 2; C gets 3 (same  as I)
Initial  distribution  III:
A gets 2
B gets 1
C gets 3
Result: no trades  (different from I)
Initial  distribution  IV:
A gets  3
B gets 1
C gets 2
Result:  B keeps  1, A gets 2,  C gets 3 (same as III,  different
from I and II)
It  seems  unnecessary  to  continue  through  all  the  permuta-
tions,  since  the result is clear:  who ends with which island depends
on  who  has  which  island  to  start  with,  and  on the  preferences  as
among  islands  of  different  Crusoes.  After  the  islands  have  been
finally  distributed,  each  Crusoe  will  equalize  the  marginal  returns
of work and leisure.  But the  result of this equalization  process,  the
actual division  of time,  depends  on who  has  which  island  rather
than  on  anything  in  "nature."  There  is  no  particular  work/leisure
tradeoff that  is  natural,  any  more  than there  is  a  natural  distribu-
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tion of islands.  Another  way  to  put the  same  point  is  to  say  that
there  are  multiple  possible  efficient  outcomes  given  a  set  of
Crusoes  and  a  set  of islands.  Once  the  trading  process  is  com-
pleted,  and each  Crusoe  has equalized  the marginal  returns  of dif-
ferent  kinds  of  work  and  leisure,  the  situation  will  be  Pareto
optimal.  But there are  as many  actual  contents  for the  optimal  so-
lution as there are post-trading  distributions  of islands.
3.  The  Optimal Work/Leisure Tradeoff-The  problem  is  not
just that the  (optimal) work/leisure choices  of the  Crusoes  depend
on the  distribution  of islands.  There are  also a multiplicity  of possi-
ble  optimal  tradeoffs,  even  after  we  have  stipulated  that  each
Crusoe  will  "own"  an  island and have  defined  the initial  distribu-
tion of particular  islands  to particular  Crusoes.  This set of possibili-
ties  will  vary  according  to  how  we  define  particular  rules within
our regime of individual ownership  of islands.
a.  The Duress Problem25-Suppose  that  a storm  wipes  out  all
the  crops  a particular  Crusoe  has  planted  on his  island.  Under  a
"strict" private-property regime,  no other Crusoe is obliged  to  save
the unfortunate  from starvation.  The victim  of disaster will have  to
sell  his  island  or  his  labor  in  exchange  for  food  to  carry  him
through  the  crisis.  Let  us  suppose  that  in  exchange  for  help  he
agrees  to work  4 hours  a  day  for a year  for a  neighboring  Crusoe.
Supposing  this  transaction  is  permissible  under  the  existing prop-
erty  regime,  it  will  radically  change  the  work/leisure  marginal
equalities  for both  the  master  and  the  servant.  The  servant  now
has  only  20  instead  of  24  hours  to  allocate  between  different
sources of satisfaction.  The master has to  decide  how work and lei-
sure look to him  given that lie has  available  four hours worth of la-
bor "for free,"  so to speak, each  day.
Given  a  series  of exchanges  of this  type,  the  multiple-Crusoe
economy  will soon be producing a mix  of leisure  and various  kinds
of work completely  different  from that which  occurred  in its initial
state.  Still, the defender of private property will note  with satisfac-
tion that all the possible  outcomes are bound to be efficient,  in the
Paretian  sense. In each,  each Crusoe maximizes the satisfactions  he
derives from  the resources  he has a "right" to,  given the initial dis-
tribution  of islands.  No  matter  how  things  fall  out,  it  will  have
been  impossible  to  make  one  person  better  off  without  hurting
someone  else.
25.  The  following discussion  was  inspired  by  Hale,  Bargaining, Duress, and
Economic Liberty, 43 CoLuM.  L. REv.  603 (1943).
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b.  Changing the  Duress Rule-Now  let  us  suppose  that  the
regime of rights  to which  all the  Crusoes  have agreed  is  more like
FSN  than  PP  or  SON.  It contains  the  following  rule:  "If, through
no  fault of his own,  a  Crusoe  does  not have  enough  food  on  hand
to last until the  next harvest,  he may demand  of the  Crusoe on the
nearest island,  as a matter  of right,  enough  food  to  tide  him  over,
or  one  half of the  stock  of the  neighboring  Crusoe,  whichever  is
less.  At  the next harvest,  any  Crusoe who  has  exercised  this right
must  repay  the  borrowed  food,  without  interest.  Nothing  in  the
above  shall be  construed  to  prohibit  any  Crusoe  from making  any
bargain he pleases with regard to any part of his property."
Under  this  rule,  each  Crusoe  will  still  attempt to  produce  to
the  point  at  which  the  marginal  returns  from  different  kinds  of
work and  from leisure  are equal.  But that point will turn  out to be
different  from  what  it was  under  the  old  duress  rule.  Work  may
seem  less  attractive,  in  so  much  as  its  product  may be  taken,  at
least  temporarily,  by a  needy neighbor.  It may  also  be less  attrac-
tive  in  so  much  as it  is no  longer necessary  to accumulate  a hoard
adequate  to  survive  a  catastrophe  without  having to  submit  to  the
mercies  of a rapacious  neighbor.  On  the other hand,  types of work
which  once  seemed  a frivolous  waste,  given  the  necessity  of pro-
viding against disaster,  may now be much more attractive.  Or work
might  seem  not  more  attractive,  but  necessary  in  order  to  have
stocks  large enough  to be comfortable  even if called  on by a neigh-
bor  in  need.  Depending  on  the interplay  of these  conflicting  ele-
ments,  a  new  set  of equalities  of marginal  return  will  eventually
emerge.
Can  one say that the work/leisure  tradeoff under property with
the first duress  rule is more  or less natural than that under the sec-
ond?  Certainly  not.  In  each  case,  people  maximize  their  satisfac-
tions  given  their initial rights.  In  each  case,  no matter  how things
fall out,  it will have been  impossible to make one person better off
without  hurting  another,  given  the  initial  rights.  In  neither  case
does  the  law prohibit  an owner  from  doing  as he chooses  with his
holdings,  or prevent a willing buyer and a willing seller of property
from getting together on any terms they please.
It  is  true  that  the  choices  between  work  and  leisure  and
among  different  kinds  of work will  be  different  as  between  these
regimes.  And it is true that, over time,  some people would be bet-
ter off under one  regime  while  other  people  would  be  better off
under the alternative  regime.  It is  even true that the total quantity
of  "goods  and  services,"  as  measured  by  total  hours  of work  or
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some  more particularized  indexing scheme,  might be much  greater
under  one  regime  than  another.  But  since  both  regimes  are  effi-
cient,  and since there is no "natural"  set of tradeoffs between work
and  leisure,  there  is  no way to  choose  between  the  regimes with-
out  first  deciding  how to  compare  the  values  of different  people's
satisfactions.
c.  Crusoes in  the  State  of Nature-Now suppose  that  the
Crusoes  fail  to  institute  a property  regime  on  becoming  aware  of
one  anothers'  existence.  The ordering  that emerges  from  their  in-
teractions  is  strictly  alegal,  and  the  only  constraints  on individual
behavior  are  those arising  from the balance  of force  and  the  struc-
ture  of preferences.  Each  Crusoe  will  have  to  decide  how  much
and what kind of work  to do.  Some will base the decision  on an ex-
pectation  of being able  to take the fruits  of the labor of others;  oth-
ers  will  expect  to  be  victims.  The  original  distribution  of islands
and parts  of islands  will undergo  all  kinds  of vicissitudes  as  coali-
tions or kingdoms form and reform.
It is  obvious that the incentives  associated  with work of differ-
ent kinds and with leisure will be radically  different in the  state  of
nature than under either of our two property regimes.  Under prop-
erty, each Crusoe  knew he could keep what he produced  on his is-
land, but had no claim  on what  anyone else  produced,  except that
under the  second property  regime  there was  a limited right to  as-
sistance  in an  emergency.  In the  state  of nature,  one  knows  what
one can keep  only to the extent one can  accurately predict the bal-
ance  of force.  But  there  are nonetheless  a number  of crucial  ways
in which the two situations are similar.
First,  each  Crusoe  will  still  try to  equate  his  expected  mar-
ginal  returns  from  different  kinds  of work  and from  leisure.  Each
will, according to the postulate of rational maximizing, make himself
as  well  off as  possible  given  his  expected  access  to  resources  and
products.  Some  will  do  much  better  under  SON,  some  much
worse.  But  all  will  make  the  same  marginal  equations  they  made
under the  property  regime.  The  results  will be  different,  but the
form of private rationality will not.
Second,  it is  no more  true  of the results in the  state of nature
than of the results under one  or another property regime that they
are "natural."  Once the  Crusoes find themselves  as a matter of fact
in  a  state  of  society,  all  of the  possible  structures  of incentives
available  to  them  are  social,  rather  than  natural,  so  there  is  no
sense in which  the particular  choices  among kinds of work  and be-
tween  work and  leisure are "distorted"  in one  situation or another.
[Vol.  8: 711
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Distortion  implies  an  undistorted  norm.  If there  are  no  "natural"
incentive  structures,  then  the word  "distortion"  seems  appropriate
only if we define one or another regime as correct,  and compare all
other  regimes  to  it.  But we have  found  no basis  in  economic  rea-
soning for choosing a norm.26
26.  People  who are  familiar  with the  literature  on taxation  may want to  object
at this  point that it is well  known that there are "efficiency  costs of progressive  taxa-
tion"  because  of distortion  of the  work/leisure  tradeoff.  See,  e.g.,  J.  DUE  &  A.
FRIEDLANDER,  GOVERNMENT  FINANCE:  ECONOMICS  OF THE PUBLIC  SECTOR 200-04
(6th ed.  1977). If taxation  distorts the tradeoff then it would seem to follow  a fortiori
that unrestrained  theft must do  so far more.  The simple  answer  is  that the lawyers'
understanding  of the economists'  distortion argument is incorrect.
To begin with, economists assert that all except what they call  "lump-sum"  taxa-
tion  is  distorting  and  has  "efficiency  costs."  A  lump-sum  tax  is  a  fixed  taking  of
goods  or money  imposed on a particular person regardless of that person's income or
activity  level.  Second,  the  distortion  is  not  of the  work/leisure  trade-off that would
occur  with  no taxation at all.  Rather, the claim  is that as between  lump-sum and any
form  of proportional  or progressive  taxation of income,  lump sum  is preferable.  The
reason for  this  is that the lump-sum  method allows the taxpayer  to  make the choice
between  work and leisure  in any  way that will maximize his satisfaction,  given that
he  has to pay the lump sum.  By contrast, a proportional  tax on income that raises ex-
actly  the  same  amount  of money  has  an  effect  on  work  incentives  beyond  the
"wealth  effect"  of the lump-sum  tax. There  is  a  familiar graphic  illustration of this
point:
A
Income
D
C
Ga
0  Leisure  B
E
a,  ,  = preference  isoquants.
AB =  No tax.
CB = Proportional  tax.
DE = Lump-sum  tax  raising  revenue  from  this person  equal  to that
raised by the proportional  tax.
F = welfare level with no tax.
G = welfare level with proportional  tax.
H =  welfare level with lump-sum tax.
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d.  Labor  "Wasted"  on  Protection Against  Theft-Our  last
proposition  may  seem easy  to refute  simply by pointing  out that in
the state  of nature people will have  an incentive  to produce  goods
that the stronger  cannot so  easily  take from  them,  rather than  the
goods  they want most,  and also  have an incentive  to spend time on
devices  designed  to  make  theft  more  difficult.  Since  they  would
prefer  to  have  the products  of an  equal  amount  of time  spent  un-
der a property regime,  it would  appear  that property  must gener-
ate a net increase in welfare.
2 7
An  easy  answer  is  that PP involves  its  own  kinds  of "unpro-
ductive"  actvities,  like  lawyering,  prosecuting,  judging,  and  hous-
ing the legal  system.  Whether,  under any particular  set of circum-
stances,  these  will  cost  more  or  less  than  fences  (etc.)  is  an
empirical question.
Furthermore,  we cannot treat the argument about precautions
The crucial point here is that the distortion argument has  to do with the compar-
ison between two methods  of taxation.  It has  nothing to  do with the comparison  be-
tween  a  tax  and  no  tax  at  all.  Indeed,  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  the
work/leisure  tradeoff in  a  lump-sum-tax  situation  will be  the  same  as  that  in  the
pretax  situation. That depends  on the  shape  of the taxpayer's  indifference  curves  at
different levels of real income. No reputable  economist would  argue that the change
in the  work/leisure  tradeoff involved  in moving from  no  tax  to  a lump-sum  tax  is  a
distortion,  or that  guch  a move  is inefficient.  The  pretax tradeoff is no  more  and no
less "natural"  than that generated by efficient taxation.
When  we  compare  the  pretax  tradeoff to  that  which  occurs  under  inefficient
(non-lump-sum)  taxation,  there  is still  no basis  for  a judgment  in  terms  of distortion
or inefficiency.  Again, neither  the  pretax  nor the  inefficient  tax  tradeoff is  natural.
But, much more  important,  the inefficiency  of the proportional  or progressive  tax  is
inefficiency only vis-a-vis  a lump-sum  tax. As  between the two taxes,  we can say that
it would have  been possible  to  make the taxpayer better off, without hurting anyone
else,  by moving from  proportionality  to lump  sum.  That is the  point of the diagram.
But  as  between  a  tax  and  no  tax,  we  can  restore  the  no-tax-tradeoff  only  by
eliminating taxation  altogether, and that will obviously hurt the recipients  of public
funds. In order to decide whether the relief to taxpayers  is of greater weight than the
harm to  the overlapping  group of beneficiaries  of taxation, we  need a  social welfare
function  that  states  our  basis  for  making  interpersonal  comparisons  of utility.  See
generally R.  MUSGRAVE  &  P.  MUSGRAVE,  PUBLIC  FINANCE  IN  THEORY  AND  PRAC-
TICE 461-77 (2d ed. 1976).
The point of all this  is that the economists'  taxation  analysis supports  rather than
contradicts  our discussion of the  efficiency  of private property  in general. When  we
compare  the property regime  with the state of nature, we are concerned  with some-
thing like the pretax  and posttax  situations, not with  an analogy to lump-sum  versus
proportional taxation.  The change  in the  work/leisure tradeoff when we move  to the
state of nature is like that from the imposition of a tax (any tax). It is a "change,"  not
a  "distortion,"  vis-a-vis  the  earlier  situation,  because  neither is  "natural."  The  new
situation is not inefficient, at least not a priori, because there is no way of saying that
the losses to the weak outweigh the gains to the strong.
27.  See R. POSNER, supra note 5, §  6.1, at 121-22.
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as  conclusive,  even assuming costless enforcement  of legal property
rights.  The argument assumes that the  diversion of production into
theft-proof goods and into precautions  is  a pure loss,  from the point
of view of social welfare,  so that eliminating the diversion  is a pure
gain.  But  it  is  obvious  that  the  production  is  diverted  because
some  people  are  trying  to  live  off the  products  of  others.  Elim-
inating  the  diversion  by  introducing  private  property  means  pre-
venting  the  freeloaders  from  freeloading,  as  well  as  reducing  the
wages available  to  those whose  strongest  talents  are  for serving  as
guards.  It  seems,  on  the  face  of it, that  this  should  decrease  the
welfare of the  latter groups.  When  the diversion  argument ignores
the  impact of property rules  on their welfare,  it is  patently  incon-
clusive.  The  gain  to  the  industrious  from  being  able  to  produce
what they  most want,  and  from  dismantling their  defensive  meas-
ures,  may  or may  not  be  greater  than  the  loss  to  former  thieves
and Pinkertons.  In order to  decide,  we  need  a social welfare  func-
tion that allows us to compare these gains  and losses.
4.  Sole  Ownership and Efficient Allocation-Now, it may be
felt that  in  focusing  on  the  notion  of distortion  we  have  failed  to
answer completely  the  most plausible  argument  that private prop-
erty  generates  efficient  incentives.  The  argument  may  seem  to
have  a  point  that  goes  beyond  the  distortion  question,  perhaps
something  like this: Take  (i) any  initial stock of resources  (including
human labor) expected  to be available to the members  of a society,
(ii) any well-defined  regime of rights  over the  resources and  prod-
ucts  (on the  order  of PP,  SON,  and  FSN,  but not necessarily  re-
stricted to  those),  and (iii) if the regime  is one for which  the notion
of an initial distribution is significant  (as it isn't, e.g.,  for SON),  any
well-defined  initial  distribution  of  rights.  Out  of  that  particular
combination  of resource base, regime of rights,  and initial distribu-
tion  may eventually  come  an equilibrium characterized  by a sched-
ule  of individual  welfare  positions;  or,  if no  stable  equilibrium  is
anticipated,  a  schedule  of ex  ante  expected  values  of welfare  posi-
tions over time can be inferred,  at least in principle.
Suppose  that the  form  of the  initially  chosen  regime  is  obvi-
ously not that of private property  (is, for example,  SON).  Then the
claim  we  have  to  meet  is  that  there  will  always  be  a  possible
private-property  regime such that it, in combination  with an appro-
priately  chosen  initial  distribution,  can  reasonably  be  expected  to
generate  an equilibrium--or  ex ante--outcome  in which  each entry
in  the  schedule  of individual  welfare  positions  is  higher  than  its
counterpart  entry under whatever non-PP regime we are using for
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comparison,  as  applied  to  whatever  initial  distribution  we  apply
it to.
Is there any reason, beyond those we have canvassed  in prece-
ding  sections,  for  thinking  that such  a  claim  might  be  true?  The
most plausible  line seems  to us  to be  this:  Private  property  is  that
form  of allocation among persons  of rights over things according  to
which,  for each identifiable  object of desire or utility,  there  is at all
times  just one person  (an  "owner")  who  has total,  unqualified,  and
exclusive  rights  ("sole  and  despotic  dominion,"  Blackstone  called
it28)  over  the  use,  consumption,  and  disposition  of  that  object.
Thus  understood  as denoting  a form of regime  in which  no valued
objects  are  either  collectively  owned  or  unowned,  the  notion  of
private  property  leaves  open  countless  particular  questions  as  to
the bounding or packaging of the several  things  that have  to be  ex-
haustively,  solely,  and  indivisibly  owned-for  example,  whether  a
tube  of toothpaste  is one  object or many, whether  a subsurface  es-
tate  in  land  is  severable  from  the  surface  estate,  and  so forth.  It
might  seem  entirely  coherent,  however,  to  claim  that  the form
itself is  what  is  generally  efficient  for  a  population  of  rational
maximizers.
Such  a claim would mean  that,  given whatever  knowledge  we
in fact  have about people's  actual  and expected  wants and proclivi-
ties,  there  will  always  be some  way  of carving  up  the  universe  of
valued  objects  into  a  configuration  of sole  and  exclusive  holdings
-some  particular  realization  of the private-property  form--which,
when  applied  to  an  appropriately  selected  initial  distribution,  will
generate  ex  ante or  equilibrium  outcomes  that are  Pareto superior
to those obtainable  from any non-property  regime as applied to any
initial distribution  of the same resources.
Of course,  the  specific configuration  of legally  cognizable  hold-
ings  required  to render private property  efficient would always  de-
pend  on  what we  take  those  wants  and  proclivities  to  be;  and  so
the argument we are now considering may  seem to violate our con-
dition for justifications  of private property  in terms  of presumptive
efficiency,  viz.,  that they should appeal to no factual judgment save
that people behave  as rational  maximizers.  It doesn't, however,  vi-
olate  that condition  properly  understood. The  argument  in no  way
depends  on  any  specific,  contentful  assumptions  about  wants  and
proclivities.
It asserts,  rather,  that  (i) whatever  we  think  we  know  about
28.  2 W. BLACKSTONE,  supra note 4, at *2.
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those  matters,  that  knowledge  will  point  toward  some  way  of
defining  or  restricting  the  ways  in  which  ights  over  things  are
carved  up  among  individuals  in  the  private-property  form  of sole
and  exclusive  rights  over  indivisible  objects  of utility  and  desire,
which  will  make  the  amount  of "waste"-the  sum  of transaction
costs  and deadweight  losses (missed gains from  trade)-as low  as  it
can  be within  the private-property  form;  that  (ii) waste  under this
efficient  private-property  regime  will  systematically  tend  to be less
than  under  any  distributionally  equivalent  non-property  regime;
and  that  (iii) private  property as form thus  tends  generally  toward
maximization  of social welfare.
Such  a  contention  is  one  that  our undertaking  requires  us  to
answer,  but  also  is  one  for  which  the  answer  exists  in  what  we
have  already written.  For,  so construed,  the incentives-based  argu-
ment for  private  property  reduces  to  a  claim  about  coordinational
failure:  it is,  simply,  that  beneficial  coordination  will be harder  to
arrange  in  non-property  regimes  than in  PP;  and that,  as  we  have
seen,  is  not  a  conclusion  that can  be derived  from  the  premise  of
rational  maximizing alone.
II.  FIVE  FALSE ARGUMENTS  FOR FREE CONTRACT
In  this Part,  we  discuss  five arguments  for free  contract,  each
one  closely  parallel  to  one  of the  arguments  for private  property.
As  in  Part  I,  all  the  arguments  have  in  common  that they  appeal
only  to  the  norm  of  efficiency,  and  to  the  factual  postulate  of
rational  maximizing  behavior.  By  free contract,  we mean  a  regime
in which  all transfers  of property  and  all promises  intended  to  be
legally  binding  are  without  question  performed  or  enforced,  or
substitute  penalties  exacted.  We  assume  that private  property  of
some kind exists in the background of the free contract  regime. We
will  contrast  free  contract  with  a situation  in which  neither  trans-
fers  of property nor promises  are  enforceable,  but all  the other as-
pects of a property regime  are in force.
A.  First Contract  Argument: Gains  from Trade Depend
on Enforcement
The notion that it is obviously  efficient to have  free  contract is
probably  related  to  the  fact that  one  of the  most  common  defini-
tions of efficiency refers  to a situation  in which  there are no further
transactions  perceived as  mutually profitable by the actors in a sys-
tem.  A  position  on  the  welfare-possibility  curve  is  one  where  all
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the "gains  from trade" have been  exhausted.29 From this,  it seems
a  short  step  to  two  false  conclusions:  (a) without  free  contract  it
would be impossible  (once we rule out omniscient command) to get
to the welfare possibility curve,  and (b) enforcement of contracts  al-
ways  moves  us toward the  curve, i.e.,  necessarily  makes  both  par-
ties better off than they would otherwise have  been.30
The problem  with both propositions  is  that they disregard  the
crucial  difference  between  permitting  and  enforcing  contracts.  If
the  state prohibits a  contract  that both parties  wish  to  go  through
with,  both  will be  worse  off than  they would  have  been  had  the
state  permitted  the  deal,  given  the  usual  neoclassical  tautological
definition of "better offness."  If I want to sell you my land and you
want  to buy it, for any price within  some range,  and the state  says
that we  simply  cannot  make  the  exchange  at  any  price,  then  we
will both  be worse  off, according  at  least  to  our  own  estimate  of
better-offness,  than we would be if the state let us proceed.
But letting us proceed is not at all the same thing  as  enforcing
a  past conveyance  or a  past promise  to convey.  Prohibition  means
making  the  contractual  behavior  a  crime  or  otherwise  subjecting
those who  contract to sanctions  designed to stop  them from  making
deals.  The  decision  to  lift  such  sanctions  will  let  us  convey,  or
agree to convey,  as we see fit. It will therefore permit us  to realize
the gains from trade,  as long as,  in the executory contract case,  the
trade still looks  mutually desirable at the time for performance.
The  question  is:  why  do we  need,  in  order  to  reap  the  full
gains  from  trade,  to go  beyond decriminalizing  and in  every other
way  permitting  contractual  behavior?  Is  there  a  connection  be-
tween  enforcement  and  efficiency?  It  is  not  enough  to  respond,
with  our proposition  (b) above,  that once  we  have  a contract freely
entered  it would be inefficient  not to  enforce  it because  both par-
ties were made better off by entering into it.  (We supposedly know
they were made better off because  if they hadn't been  they would
not  have  bound  themselves  in  the  first  place.)  The  trouble  with
this  argument  is  that  it does  not follow,  from  the  fact  that  at  the
time  they made  the  contract  both parties  thought it would  make
them  better  off when  it was  finally  executed,  that  it will  actually
make  them  both  better  off when  the  time  for  actual  performance
arrives.
29.  For a helpful summary of the concepts  used here, see ECONOMIC  FOUNDA-
TIONS,  supra note 1, at xi-xiii.
30.  See Tullock, The Logic of the Law, in ECONOMICS  OF CONTRACT  LAW,  su-
pra note  1, at 22.
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Indeed,  as  of  the  time  of the  lawsuit,  the  enforcement  of a
contract cannot be said to make both parties better off. If perform-
ance  was  in  the  interest  of both  parties  it  would  normally  occur
without  enforcement.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  always  the  possibility
that  parties  engaged  in  strategic  maneuvers  over  division  of  the
surplus  might  bluff each  other  into  a jointly  mistaken  "no  deal."
This  possibility  cannot  be  avoided  by  enforcing  contracts,  and  is
therefore  irrelevant  to our  argument here.  The fact  that one  party
demands  enforcement shows beyond doubt that the other party be-
lieves that performance  is not now in his best interests.
In other words, the meaning of enforcement  of contracts  is the
application  of ineluctable  force to make people  do things they don't
then  want  to  do.  The  fact that at  some  earlier  point in  time  they
agreed to  do what they are now being forced  to do does  not in any
way indicate  that they are  made better off by being  forced to  do it
later.  The economic  argument in favor  of contracts  therefore  has to
be more complex  than a simple  assertion  that the state  is changing
things in everyone's interests by intervening.
While  it's  easy enough  to  see why  this argument doesn't work
for  the  enforcement  of contracts  that  are  fully  executory  on both
sides,  it is less  obvious that it doesn't work  for enforcement  of con-
veyances.  In the case  of the  conveyance,  the transfer is instantane-
ous.  When  the  parties  execute  the  conveyance,  say  land  for
money,  it  does  follow  that both  are better  off in  the  second  after
the  transaction  than they were  in the  second before it.  But it does
not follow  that the  state should  enforce the  conveyance  when one
party  goes  back  on the  deal,  say  offering back the  money  and de-
manding  back the land. If the state  takes  the position that the  land
now  belongs  to  the  buyer,  so  that the  buyer  can  refuse  to  hand
it  back,  it  is  not  making  everyone  better  off  than  she  would
have  been  had  the  state  adopted  one  of the  alternative  possible
positions.
There  are  at  least  two  alternatives  to  enforcing  the  convey-
ance:  (1) The  state  might  treat  all  attempts  to  alienate  property
rights  as  null and void,  so  that  any  original  holder  can  always  get
state  intervention  to  reassert  all  his  original  rights  whenever  he
wants to,  in  spite of his purported  agreement  to  the contrary.31 (2)
31.  The  state  in fact  does  this  in  numerous  particular  situations  in  order  to
achieve  specific objectives.  These  range  from nonenforcement  designed to encour-
age  formal precision  or deliberation (consideration doctrine) through nonenforcement
designed  to  deter  immoral  conduct  (illegality  doctrine).  See  generally  Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89  HARv.  L. REV.  1685,  1690-94
(1976).
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The state might treat the conveyance  as  nullifying  the seller's right
vis-a-vis  the  buyer,  without  giving  the  buyer  a  right vis-a-vis  the
seller,  so that neither  has  a  right, and  enjoyment  depends  on  the
balance  of lawful force.  (This would be compatible with  continuing
to enforce a right in either or both of them against third parties.32)
The  choice  between  enforcing  the  conveyance  and  adopting
one of these alternatives  will  affect the welfare  of buyer and seller
in  different  ways.  Looking  at  the  moment  when  the  state  has  to
choose  which way to go,  it is  obviously wrong to say that enforcing
the  conveyance  always  or  generally  makes  both  parties  better off
than they would be under  the alternatives.  The seller might prefer
nonenforcement  of both  parties'  contract  rights,  and  prefer  even
more that the  state  enforce  their preexisting rights  against  one  an-
other.  He is worse off if the state  enforces the conveyance.
The  parallel  between  this  first  set  of arguments  for  contract
and  the  first  set  of arguments  for  property  is  as  follows.  In  each
case,  we  tend  to  confuse  the  legal  "permission"  of the  SON  with
some  kind  of state policy  guaranteeing  that  the permission  will  be
acted  on.  In  the  property  case,  because  random  depredations  are
not illegal,  and  because  no  one is  legally  obliged  to work,  we  as-
sume  that  random  depredation  will  be  common  and  that people
will  respond  to  it  by  not  working.  We  disregard  the  possibility
that, in spite of the absence of any legal regulation of the  situation,
there  will  emerge  a  reasonably  certain  balance  of  force  under
which  people  are compelled  (nonlegally)  to work  and  strictly  pre-
vented from  random  depredations.  Likewise,  in  the  contract  case
there  is  an initial  tendency  to  see the  elimination  of binding  con-
tract  as  meaning  that  people  certainly  will  not  make  and  keep
agreements  and  that  all  gains  from  trade  must  therefore  go  un-
realized.
B.  Second Contract  Argument: Breaches that Don't
"Increase  Welfare" are Inefficient
Suppose you and I have a contract. If I perform,  I will end up
with  $5;  you will end up with $10.  After we make  this deal,  I  dis-
32.  The  state  sometimes  does  this  in  fact,  as  in the  case  of "illegal"  convey-
ances.  For example,  when  residential  premises  have  been  leased in  violation  of  a
housing code, the state may simultaneously (i) refuse to enforce the lessor's claim for
rent, (ii) refuse  to  recognize  the lessee's  claim  to possession  for  the balance  of the
lease  term,  and  (iii)  refuse  to  assist in  the  lessor's  effort  to  evict  the  lessee.  See
Robinson v.  Diamond Hous.  Corp.,  433  F.2d 497, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam);
Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,  237 A.2d  834, 836-37 (D.C.  1968).
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cover another  opportunity that I could take  if I broke my  contract
with you.  If I  took  that opportunity  and did  not have  to pay  you
damages,  I  would  end  up  with  $6  and  you  would  end  up  with
nothing.  My breach would  gain me a  dollar and  cost you  ten. It is
a common intuition that it would be inefficient for the law to "per-
mit breach"  under these circumstances, 33  so that the institution  of
enforceable  contract  is,  to  that extent  at least,  economically  desira-
ble.  This  argument  parallels  the  one  justifying  property  on  the
ground that theft is inefficient because it may hurt the victim  more
than it benefits the thief.
A  first  problem  with  this  argument  is  that  if  there  are  no
transaction  costs  there  will  be  no  breach  even  without  legal  en-
forcement.  I will  offer you a chance to  save something from the de-
bacle:  we  will go  through with  the  deal,  and  you  will make  me a
side payment of, say,  $9.95. The contract will be performed, but at
the end of the operation  I will be at $14.95 rather than at $5,  and
you will be at $0.05 instead of at $10.  The  only difference between
this  outcome,  and  the  one  that  would  have  occurred  if you  had
been  able  to  get  a  decree  of specific  performance  without  a  side
payment,  is  "distributional."  That  is,  the  allocation  of resources  is
exactly the same,  but the distribution  of the benefits from that allo-
cation  is quite different.
Now  suppose  there  are  transaction  costs,  so  that  it  is  clear
no  side  payments  will be  made.  The  choice  is  now between  en-
forcement,  which  leaves  me  at  $5  and  you  at  $10,  and  nonen-
forcement,  which  leaves  me  at  $6  and  you  at  zero.  We  cannot
say  that  one  of these  solutions  is  Pareto  superior  to  the  other.
Which  one  we prefer  depends  on how  we  value  a  $1 increase  in
my income  as against  a $10  fall in yours  (not to  speak of the prob-
lem of adding in  the  gains,  if I breach,  to  the  person  whom  I  do
contract with).
The concept  of efficiency  does  tell  us  that  as  between  breach
and  performance  with  a  side  payment,  the  second  is  better  than
the  first.  In  comparison,  performance  with  a  side  payment  leaves
both of us better off than we  would be in the  event of breach  (me
at $14.95  vs.  $6  and you  at $0.05 vs.  zero)-again  leaving  out the
third party I  deal with if I breach my contract with you.  And from
33.  Some such intuition must underlie the "theory of efficient breach,"  no part
of which  addresses  the  efficiency  vel  non  of blanket  nonenforcement.  See  Barton,
The  Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, in  ECONONCS  OF  CON-
TRACT LAW,  supra note  1,  at  154;  Goetz  & Scott,  Liquidated Damages, in  Eco-
NOMICS  OF CoNTRAcT  LAW, supra note  1,  at 194.
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this we can infer that it would be inefficient for the court  to penal-
ize  the  making  of the  side  payment,  supposing  that  the  only  al-
ternative  was  breach.  But  as  between  breach  and  performance
without a side payment, we cannot say that either makes both of us
better off, so that efficiency provides no basis  for choosing between
them.
C.  Third Contract  Argument: Enforcement Reduces Uncertainty
By far  the  most familiar  economic  argument  for  the  enforce-
ment  of contracts  is  that the  state thereby  reduces  the uncertainty
of economic  activity,  and  makes  everyone  better  off in  the  pro-
cess.34  This  argument is  closely analogous  to  the uncertainty  argu-
ment about  private  property.  Like  that argument,  it  suffers  from
one-sidedness.  It focuses  on the experience  of the promisee,  who is
assured by the institution of legal enforcement  that he will  receive
either  performance  or  its  equivalent  (if the  promisor  is  solvent).
But it leaves  out altogether  the impact of enforcement  on the expe-
rience  of promisors.  For  promisors,  the  legal  enforcement  of con-
tracts means  a  substantial increase in  the uncertainty  attending en-
gaging in economic activity.  If contracts  are enforced,  it means  that
the  promisor  who  becomes  unable  or  unwilling  to  perform  for
reasons  not  amounting  to  an  excuse  will  have  to  pay  damages,
whereas  in a world without  enforcement  there is  no need to worry
about such things.
As  in  the  case  of  the  uncertainties  associated  with  private
property,  it  is  perfectly  possible  that  promisees'  pains  of uncer-
tainty about breach by promisors  are  generally  greater than prom-
isors'  pains of uncertainty  about the future conditions  under which
they will  be  forced  to  pay up  by promisees.  If so,  there  is  a  net
gain  from  moving to the  enforcement  of contracts.  But whether  or
not the balance  of uncertainty  costs  lies in  this direction  is  an  em-
pirical question,  since to settle it we need to discover how different
people  actually  feel  about  it,  and  also  an  ethical  question,  since
once  having  made  our  empirical  determination  we  need  a  social
welfare  function  that tells  us  how  to  make  interpersonal  compari-
sons  of  the  utility  gains  and  losses  of  the  different  people  in-
volved. 35
34.  E.g., M.  WEBER,  LAW  IN ECONOMY  AND  SOCIETY  33-40  (M.  Rheinstein  ed.
1954).
35.  Our position may at first seem, but is not in fact, inconsistent with the intu-
ition that enforcing contracts  is good insomuch  as it enables people  to realize the "ex
ante"  gains available  from trading in risks. The pure case  is the insurance  contract or
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D.  Fourth Contract  Argument: Coordinational  Failure
The  coordinational  failure  argument  for  free  contract  is  that
without  state  enforcement  people  will  be  discouraged  from
"relying"  on  promises  of others,  for  fear  that promisors  will  back
out in midstream.  This  argument is analogous  to the argument that
both  in the state of nature and in  that of forced  sharing people  will
be discouraged from producing,  on the one hand by the fear of los-
ing their products  to  others,  and  on  the other by the  hope of suc-
cessful freeloading.36
Here,  the  idea is that activity  in reliance  on promises  is a cru-
cial component  of production under an intricate  system  of the  divi-
sion  of labor  based  on  investment.  If people  are  assured  of per-
formance  by contractual  partners,  they will  engage  in  all kinds  of
arrangements  for the future, and the  totality of these arrangements
over time will be clearly preferred by them to the net returns  over
time  if there were  no  state guarantee  of performance.  (Otherwise,
knowing  about  enforcement  practices,  they  wouldn't  enter  into
them.)
If there  is  no enforcement,  there  is  fear that contractual  part-
ners will  take  advantage  of the vulnerability  created  by reliance  in
order  to  renegotiate  the  terms  in  midstream,  to  the  detriment  of
its mirror image, the bet: A  and B  both assess  the odds  against Lucky  Charm's win-
ning the fifth at Pimlico at 6:1;  but A  is risk-neutral  (a bet against  Lucky Charm has
positive value for him at any odds  lower than  6:1) while B  is risk-preferring (a bet on
Lucky  Charm has  positive  value  for  him at any  odds  higher than 4:1),  and  so they
can both  reap an immediate  gain in satisfaction  if, but only if, they can make an en-
forceable bet on the race  (at any odds between 4:1 and 6:1).
It does  not, however,  follow  that a  practice  of enforcing  bets  is  on  the  whole
good  for, or  preferred  by,  either A  or B.  For either  or both  of them,  it may be the
case that, though a gain in satisfaction accrues  at the instant the bet is made, the loss
in satisfaction  in  case  the bet is  lost,  discounted by  the  improbability of losing,  is
more  significant. Those  two  propositions  are  not, as  some  might  imagine,  mutually
contradictory.  Quite aside  from the  engrossing metaphysical  problem  of whether the
A  or B who makes the bet is the same experiencing  entity as the A  or B  who loses  it,
there is the more simple-minded  possibility that either or both of A  and B  may occa-
sionally,  or even regularly, underestimate how much it will hurt to  lose. Such  a pos-
sibility is inconsistent  neither with rationality (since it is  a matter of missing or mis-
taken information),  nor with a relish for  risk ex  ante. No more irrational would be an
ex  ante preference  for a legal regime  (i.e., nonenforcement  of contracts)  which tends
to  protect against  certain  adverse  consequences  of mistakenly  low appraisals  of the
pains  of future  bad fortune. A  classic  image  of rationality  is  Odysseus bound  to the
mast as  he  sails  by the  Sirens'  rock.  See  Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dy-
namic Utility Maximization, 23 REv. ECON.  STUD.  165 (1955).
36.  See  Birmingham,  Game Theory & Contract Law,  in  ECONOMICS  OF  CON-
TRACT  LAw, supra note  1, at  16-31;  Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Con-
tract  Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 60-63  (1936).
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the  relying promisee.  This inability  to  trust one's partners  discour-
ages  one from  entering  into  any  contracts  at all.  The  result is  that
all  are  worse  off than  they  would  have  been  if they  had  known
from  the  beginning  that  both  their  promises  and  those  of  other
people would be enforced.
It is  important  to distinguish this  argument  from the pure  un-
certainty  argument  discussed  a moment  ago.  According  to  that  ar-
gument,  all  are  made  better  off by  enforcement  of contracts  sim-
ply  because  they  now  know  that  promisors  will  perform.  That
argument  left  out  of  account  that  all  may  also  be  promisors,
and  may  therefore  be  made  worse  off by uncertainty  about  what
will happen  to  them  if circumstances  turn  out to  incline  them  to-
ward breach.  The coordinational  failure argument  is  concerned  not
with  the distribution  of the ill effects  of the factual uncertainty  that
is inevitable  in life, but with arrangements to control the phenome-
non  of distrust. The  existence  of distrust  may  not  be  inevitable,
nor is it necessarily impossible  to eliminate  it when it exists.
The  legal  system  makes  others  trustworthy,  according  to  this
argument,  replacing  the  unshakeable  suspicion  that  they  will  do
the wrong thing with the certainty  that they will  do the right thing
or its  economic  equivalent.  Whereas  the  enforcement  of contracts
simply redistributes the  burden  of  uncertainty  about  the  future
course  of the  natural  or  social  world,  legal  enforcement  actually
eliminates distrust. This  is  a true net gain  for everyone.  It will,  or
could, make  everyone better off.
As  in  the  case  of private property,  there  are  two  kinds of ob-
jections  to the coordinational  failure argument. The first is  that the
postulate of rational maximizing itself is not enough to justify a pre-
diction that the structure of life  in a world without enforceable  con-
tracts  is a strategic  dilemma.  The second is  that it is quite possible
that a  world  of contract  enforcement  will be  a  strategic  dilemma.
Given  that  nonenforcement  is  not necessarily  suboptimal,  and that
the  contract  world may  be  suboptimal,  there  is  no basis  for a con-
clusion  that  everyone  will  be  or  could  be  better  off if we  move
from no enforcement to free contract.
It  seems  unnecessary  to  rehearse  in  detail  the  argument  that
nonenforcement  may  not be  a  strategic  dilemma.  The parties  may
trust each  other without  legal sanctions.  They  may have  long term
relationships  or repeat dealings which  make it possible  for them to
calculate  their partners'  long-term  interests,  so  that  they can  rely
on  performance  without  anything  so  moralistic  as  trust.  Or  one
party may dominate  the other to  such an extent that trust is  irrele-
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vant,  given  the  far greater  certainty  about  performance  generated
by the imbalance of force.
The  argument  about  the  possible  suboptimality  of a  contract
regime  is less obvious.  It is  analogous to the argument that  a prop-
erty  regime  may  lead  to  catastrophe  in  a  situation  where  every-
one's  insistence  on  his  privilege  of withdrawing  his property  from
the  network  of the  division  of labor  causes  a  breakdown  of  eco-
nomic activity.  Imagine that an unexpected event causes  a business
to fail and default on its contractual obligations  to another  business.
The essence  of the  contract  regime  is  that, short  of excuse  by im-
possibility,  there  is  the possibility  of each  link  in  the  contractual
chain  insisting  on its full  right to  performance  or damages  from  all
its  partners.  It may  happen  that because  each person  in  the chain
believes  that every other person in  the  chain  will insist on his full
rights,  each person believes  that he must also  do so,  or face  a total
loss.  He  will then  insist on his  rights  even though  if all moderated
their  contract  claims  in  exchange  for  moderation  of their  contract
obligations,  everyone would be better off.
There  is  even  an  analogue  to  the  freeloader  in this  situation.
Suppose  that  by  informal  agreement  all  parties  forego  strict  en-
forcement  of their  contract  claims,  through  a  series  of unilateral
forgivenesses  or delays  of payment. A freeloader  might believe that
he  could  insist  on  full  payment  without  bringing  the whole  tacit
agreement  down,  just because he amounted  to  such a small part of
the  total  of contract  indebtedness.  But if everyone  sees himself as
in the  position  of the  freeloader,  or if everyone  thinks  all the  oth-
ers will  see  themselves  that way, then  no tacit  agreement  to mod-
erate claims will occur.
Of course,  it  may  be  possible  to  eliminate  the  dilemma  by
having the state step  in to enforce a moratorium  on the payment of
all contract  indebtedness  for a period of time  sufficient for  the res-
toration  of confidence.  But  there  is  no  guarantee  that adding  such
an  apparently  inconsistent  rule  to  the  institution  of free  contract
can  get  us  out  of the  dilemma.  There  just isn't  any  basis  in  the
weak  assumptions  of rational  maximizing  and  Pareto  optimality  for
concluding that any legal or alegal regime can preclude  or will nec-
essarily produce the dilemma.
E.  Fifth Contract Argument: Distortion of the Tradeoff Between
Present and Future Goods
This  argument  is  closely  analogous  to  that  which  asserts  that
property  is  efficient  because  it assures  an  undistorted  tradeoff be-
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tween work and  leisure,  and among  possible  products.  The notion
is that contract allows us  to treat a future satisfaction  as  no less cer-
tain than a present satisfaction.  If there  is no contract  enforcement,
future  satisfactions  are  less  certain,  and  we  are  therefore  going to
be biased  in  favor  of the present. Where  the  bias  is removed,  we
choose between  "consumption"  and "investment"  as we  "really"  or
"naturally" value them.37
There  is  an  obviously  wrong  interpretation  of this  argument
that  is  like  the  idea that  people  will  work  more  with  property  in
the fruits  of their labor  than they will if they have  to worry about
theft.  Here,  it is  not true that making  future satisfactions  less cer-
tain  will  necessarily  reduce  investment  designed  to  produce  such
satisfactions.  It  all  depends  on  the  relationship  between  income
and substitution effects.  We are concerned  with the more  sophisti-
cated  version  which  speaks  in  terms  of  distortion  rather  than  in
terms of a reduction in absolute quantities of one thing or another.
The response  to this argument  is  to acknowledge  that the allo-
cation  of resources  between  consumption  and  investment  will  be
different with enforceable  contract than it would be without (almost
certainly  different,  though  there's  nothing  that  logically precludes
the two  situations  turning  out the same).  But the  existence  of dif-
ference  does  not  establish  bias  or  distortion,  and  it  is  not  at  all
clear why  the result with contract  should  be  taken  as  the natural
benchmark  reflecting  people's  real  preferences.  The  analysis  goes
exactly as it did with  the Crusoes  in  the property discussion:  (1) It
does  make  sense  to  say  that  a  sole  producer's  choices  between
present  and  future  consumptions  are  "natural"  and  reflect  his
"real"  preferences.  (2)  If we  introduce  some  more  Crusoes  and
start up trade without enforceable  contract,  we will get a pattern of
choices  for  each  actor  that  still  represents  his  maximum  given  his
preferences.  (3) When we add  enforceable  contract,  we change  all
these choices once  again,  but everyone  is still maximizing  given his
preferences.  (4) The  move  from unenforceable  to  enforceable  does
not  necessarily  make  everyone  better  off,38  so  it  is  hard  to  see
what's  so  natural about  the choices  or preferences  expressed,  after
it occurs,  by each actor.
III.  GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS  ON THE
EFFICIENCY OF ENTITLEMENTS
In this Part we  present a more  abstract version of our critique
37.  ECONOMICS  OF  CoNTRACT  LAW, supra note  1, at 3.
38.  See pp. 733-34 supra.
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of efficiency  arguments about basic private-law  institutions.  In  con-
sidering  the specific  cases  of private property and enforceable  con-
tract,  we  were  mainly  concerned  with  arguments  based  on  the
notion  that  those  institutions  were  more  "certain"  than  the  alter-
natives,  and with  arguments  that those  institutions would  serve  to
prevent  breakdowns  of social  cooperation  in  the face  of transaction
costs  (including information  gaps  and associated  strategic behavior).
We want to argue here that the refutations we have  already offered
of certainty  and  coordination  arguments  can  be extended  to  cover
any private  law institution constituted by general  rules.
Our  contention  about  uncertainty  is  that  all  private  law rules
simultaneously  eliminate  and create  uncertainty,  for the  same  and
also  for different people,  so that it is never possible to  say that the
total amount  of uncertainty  has been  reduced  by a change  in legal
relations  without  knowing  both how  the  affected  individuals  react
to  the  situation  and  how to  compare  their reactions  and  resulting
experiences  according  to  some  common  scale.  Our  contention
about  coordination  is  a  good  deal  more  complex.  We  start from  a
much  more  precise  definition  of  a  property  and  contract  regime
(PPFG)  than  seemed  necessary  in  Parts  I  and  II above.  We  then
assert  that  it  is  intuitively  obvious  that  this  regime  would  be  in
danger  of breaking  down  or causing  severe  coordination  problems
if it  were  operated  without  modification  under  real-world  condi-
tions.  We  then  show that  modifications  in  the  regime  designed to
make it more  effective  in dealing with transaction  costs turn it into
a  formless  mixture  of state  of nature,  communalism,  and  PPFC,
with the parts held together  only by ad hoc judgments  as  to which
form  of arrangement  will  work better  in  response  to  the  specific
pattern of transaction costs we presuppose.  We  conclude  that argu-
ments for the  efficiency of private law entitlement  systems must be
based  on  these  specific  constellations  of transaction  costs  rather
than on the mere postulate  of rational maximizing behavior.
A.  The Notion of a Nondirective (Formal)  Order
A  formal  or  nondirective  order  is  a  collection  of rules  about
access  to  resources  and  products,  where  the  rules  are  both (i)  so
general  as  not themselves  to  specify any  particular resource  alloca-
tion  or product  distribution,  and yet (ii) so complete  as  to compose
an  informative,  regular  framework  for  purposive  private  actions
that will,  in  combination  with the  rules,  fully  determine  a prevail-
ing allocation and distribution  from time to time. The notion corre-
sponds generally  to that of "private  ordering" familiar  in contempo-
1980]
39
Kennedy and Michelman: Are Property and Contract Efficient?
Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1980HOFSTRA  LAW  REVIEW
rary  jurisprudence. 39   It  stands  opposed  to  the  notion  of
governmental  "intervention."  In  a  pure  nondirective  order,  the
government's  only  functions  will  be  those  of  elaborating,  con-
firming,  and enforcing the general  rules. Of course,  every real  con-
stitution  will  allow  for  sectors  both  of  intervention  and  of
nondirective  ordering. In  even the most laissez-faire  state,  the gov-
ernment will  engage  in some economically active  or directive roles;
and  in  even  the most  thoroughly  regulated,  there  will be  pockets
of economically  significant,  nondirected private action.
Our concern in  this Article  is with the nondirected  sector of a
society's  economic  life,  however  extensive  or  restricted  that  may
be.  The  issue  before  us  is  that  of the  kinds  of factual  judgments
needed for  comparing  the  efficiency  of a  nondirective  order based
on  private  property  and  free  contract  with  that  of  alternative
forms  of  logically  available  nondirective  orders.  Specifically,  the
question is whether it is  enough for that purpose to know that indi-
viduals  usually  act  with  a  view  to  maximizing  their  respective
"ends in life."40
To  aid  the  analysis  in  this  Part,  we  define  two  nondirective
alternatives  to  a private  property/free  contract  order (PPFC),  each
occupying  one  extreme  on  a  spectrum  of logical  possibilities.  At
one  pole  there  is  the  state  of nature  (SON),  in  which  the  only
"rule"  is  that every  person  is free  to  do  or take  whatever  she  can
with  whatever  strength  and  cunning  she has.  At the  other pole  is
the  whole  world-all  resources,  labor,  and  products-owned  in
common  by everyone  (WOC),  so  that no  one  can  do  or  use  any-
thing (or for that matter refrain  from  doing or using anything) with-
out the  consent of everyone  else.  It may  seem  paradoxical  or even
perverse  to characterize  the totally unregulated  SON  as an "order,"
and  the  totally impacted  WOC  as  "nondirective."  There  is,  how-
ever, nothing illogical about these characterizations.  Both SON  and
WOC  are  instances  of initial  situations  defined  by  general  rules,
from  which  the  only  permitted  developments  are  those  arising
from  self-motivated  individual  action  taken  subject  to  the  rules,
with  no intervention  allowed.  They  are  both,  therefore,  nondirec-
39.  See, e.g.,  H.  HART  &  A.  SACKS,  THE  LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC  PROBLEMS  IN
THE  MAKING  AND  APPLICATION  OF LAW  (tent. ed.  1958);  Kennedy, Legal Formality,
2 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  351  (1973).  Compare Hayek's  concept of "spontaneous"  and "ab-
stract"  orders,  opposed  to  which  is  the  concept  of  "interference."  See,  e.g.,  F.
HAYEK,  THE  MIRAGE OF  SOCIAL  JUSTICE  128-29  (1976);  F.  HAYEK,  RULES  AND  OR-
DER 38-39 (1973).
40.  R. POSNER,  supra note 5, § 1.1, at 3.
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tive  orders according to  our definition.  Looking at matters this way
may  initially  be  awkward  for  some,  but by  coming  to  appreciate
the  implications  of this view  one  comes  to understand  the  reasons
why  it  would  be  miraculous  if  anyone  could  show  that  PPFC,
or any  other nondirective  order,  is  generally  efficient for a popula-
tion of rational maximizers.
B.  Hohfeldian  Analysis and its Lessons
The  style of thought we  are  urging,  and  the  skeptical  conclu-
sion  to  which it  leads,  were  commonplace  for  a preceding  genera-
tion  of legal  scholars  who  famously  addressed  themselves  to  the
bearing  of law  on  economic  policy.  They  did so over a period  that
can be  said  to begin  with  the work  of Wesley  N.  Hohfeld,  whose
analytical paradigm  of "jural relations" 41 has become  a staple  of ac-
ademic  legal culture.  The period culminated  in the work of Robert
L.  Hale,42  a  highly  distinguished  precursor  of the  contemporary
school  of economics-inspired  legal-policy  analysts;  and spanned  the
chief productions  of such  Realist luminaries  (and, incidentally,  ad-
miring disciples  of Hohfeld)  as Arthur  L.  Corbin43 and Walter W.
Cook.44 Despite  the reverence  with which  its  author is  still some-
times  recalled,  Hale's  work  receives  astonishingly  little  attention
today,45  while  the  Hohfeldian  staple  survives,  like  a sack  of dried
beans,  unesteemed  by those  who  have  lost  the  recipe  for its  use.
Of Hale's oeuvre we  shall  here  say no  more  than  that it  virtually
anticipates  our  thesis;  had  it not  sunk  into  oblivion,  there  would
have  been  no  occasion  for  this  paper.  Corbin  and  Cook  have
served  us  as  interpreters  for  their  esteemed  colleague  Hohfeld,
whose  own obscurity  is  deservedly  legendary.  It is  Hohfeld's work
-blandly  familiar,  imperfectly  understood-which  is  most  funda-
mentally related to  our thesis  and which we therefore  undertake to
expound  anew.
41.  Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 26 YALE  L.J. 710, 712 (1917);  Hohfeld, Some Fundamental  Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial  Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28 (1913).
42.  R.  HALE,  FREEDOM  THROUGH  LAW  (1952);  Hale, Property and Distribu-
tion in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.  ScI.  Q. 470 (1923).
43.  Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification,  30  YALE  L.J. 226  (1921);
Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE  L.J.  163  (1919).
44.  Cook,  Introduction to W.  HOHFELD,  FUNDAMENTAL  LEGAL  CONCEPTIONS
AS  APPLIED  IN  JUDICIAL  REASONING  (W. Cook  ed.  1934);  Cook,  Privileges of Labor
Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 YALE  L.J. 779 (1918).
45.  A notable  exception  is  the revival  effort of Warren  Samuels.  Samuels, The
Economy as a System of Power and its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert
Lee Hale, 27 U.  MIAMI  L. REV.  261  (1973).
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By  today's  law  students  (not  to  speak  of  their  teachers),
Hohfeld  is  often  envisaged  as  a  chap with  a scholastic  passion  for
terminological nicety-at worst a carping bore, at best an authentic,
if pedantic  exemplar of the  academic virtue  of precision.  His con-
tribution  is  understood  to  consist  of  a  lexicon  for  distinguishing
among  several  discrete  types of legal  advantages  (entitlements,  as
we  now  commonly  say)  often  and  detrimentally  confused  in  legal
discourse-the  famous  jural  quartet  of rights,  privileges,  powers,
and  immunities.  It will be recalled  that  a "right"  or "claim  right,"
in  Hohfeld's  stipulation,  is  a  claim  one  has  to  require  or prevent,
with the state's assistance  if needed,  a certain act or class of acts by
another,46  while  one's "privilege,"  by contrast, just refers  to certain
acts  or  classes  of acts  which  one  can  do  (or not  do) without  any-
one else's being  able  to  summon state  force in  opposition. 47 Like-
wise,  a  "power"  is  one's  state-recognized  authority  to  negate  or
transfer certain  entitlements  held by oneself or others,  while  one's
"immunity"  is,  by contrast,  the  absence  of power  in another  to al-
ter one's own  entitlements.
48
Hohfeld  also  supplied  a term  for  the  negation,  or "opposite,"
of each  of the  four positive  relations,  giving  a total of eight names
for jural  relations,  out  of which  to  construct  the  famous  tables  of
"jural opposites"  and "jural correlatives": 49
JURAL  OPPOSITES
right  privilege  power  immunity
no-right  duty  disability  liability
JURAL  CORRELATIVES
right  privilege  power  immunity
duty  no-right  liability  disability
This  elaborate  exercise was  not undertaken  merely for the sake
of clarifying  discourse  by supplying  a  precise  vocabulary  that peo-
ple could use to  avoid getting distinct notions mixed  up.  It was in-
tended  to  convey  some  substantive  lessons,  one  of which  has  a
bearing on our own discussion  to follow.
The lesson is  that there  is no logically  necessary bond between
a right over some act or class  of acts and a privilege  over that same
46.  Hohfeld, Some Fundamental  Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial  Rea-
soning, 23 YALE  L.J.  16, 30-32, 34 (1913).
47.  Id. at 32-44.
48.  Id. at 44-55.
49.  Id. at 36.
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act  or class,  no  logical  reason  why  having  the right  must  go  with
having  the privilege,  or vice-versa.  Take the  act consisting of your
reading  (or not reading)  this Article.  You  are  privileged  to  do  ei-
ther, although  one  or the other  decision  on your part might inflict
harm  on us so  severe that we  would gladly pay you  a great deal  of
money  to  do  the  opposite.  If we  want  to  avoid  the  harm  of your
reading  or not reading,  there are  various  countermeasures  we  can
take,  but  these  do  not  include,  given  your  privilege,  our  sum-
moning state force  to make you do what we want or punish you for
not doing it. In  this sense,  the state "authorizes"  you to choose  be-
tween reading and not reading without regard to our welfare.
Hohfeld  and  his followers  were  eager  to  point out,  however,
that  this privilege  on your part  to read  or not read  as  you  choose
does  not logically  entail  a  right  on your part that  we  refrain  from
using our own force to make you  stop or start reading.50 Your priv-
ilege  over this  choice of uses  of your  optical and  mental apparatus
does not entail a right against our interference with  your preferred
use.  If we,  wishing  you  not  to  read,  physically  restrain  you,  we
may  have  violated  some  right  you  have  to  bodily security,  if you
have  such  a right; but we shall in no way have  violated your privi-
lege  of reading  because  it is  logically  impossible for  one person  to
violate another's privilege,  in the Hohfeldian  sense  of the term (un-
less, perhaps,  by suborning corrupt officials to use state force  to re-
strain or punish the privileged  act).  To  have a privilege  means  only
that one  is  the  beneficiary  of a state  practice  or rule  of noninter-
vention.  It  most  definitely  does  not mean  that  one  is  guaranteed
enough concrete  social  or physical power to  do what  one is  legally
privileged  to  do  against opposition  from  others  privileged to  resist
or interfere.  And just as privileges  entail no rights,  so  rights entail
no privileges.  My  having  a right,  for  example,  that  others  not in-
terfere with my bodily freedom  just means  that the state  will come
to my aid in opposition  to those who would restrain or compel me;
it does not at all  mean  that I can  do  as  I please  without incurring
state opposition  or requital.
C.  Hohfeldian Definitions of Various Nondirective Orders
Let the world be arbitrarily carved up into any number of con-
ventionally  identifiable  discrete  "things."  For now,  it doesn't mat-
ter just how  we  carve  up  the world-for  example,  whether  a  hu-
50.  E.g.,  Cook,  Privileges of Labor Unions in  the Struggle for Life,  27  YALE
L.J. 779 (1918).
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man body  is regarded  as a single,  unified thing or as a collection  of
things  like  blood,  arms,  teeth,  etc.  (or, conversely,  a "platoon"  is
regarded  as  a  unified  thing  of which  bodies  of  individuals  are
deemed  integral  parts).  In  similar  fashion,  let the  totality  of acts
that may be done to or with various  things,  including leaving them
idle, be conventionally  differentiated  into any number  of discretely
identifiable  "uses."  Then for  each of some  finite number  of things,
there is  at any moment the possibility of one  or more  out of some
finite number  of uses.  If we  let  "X'" stand  for  some  (any) specific
thing,  and  "U"  stand for  some  (any) specific  use,  then  we can  let
U, stand  for that use  of that thing.  A formal  order,  then,  is  a  col-
lection  of general,  legal  rules  about  private  entitlements  over  all
the Ux's  that are considered  to be in  the nondirective  sector at any
given moment.
1.  SON and WOC-Given this  vocabulary,  it  is  easy  to  con-
struct Hohfeldian definitions for  SON and WOC.  SON  is the order
in which  each person at all times holds a privilege  in rem51  over all
the  U.'s and WOC  is  the  order in  which  each  person  at  all times
holds a right in  rem over all the Ux's.  In both of the orders,  every-
one has at all times  an immunity in rem  against divestment of their
privileges or rights.
The Hohfeldian  SON consists  of the Table of Jural Correlatives
modified as follows:
Itg]&  Privilege  ,Povgt  Immunity
Oty  No-Right  14i1y  Disability
The state treats all actions that impinge  on other persons' interests
as  privileged,  or  in  other  words,  treats  everyone  as  having  no-
rights with  respect  to all  actions  that  affect them.  And  since there
are  no rights,  there can be no  powers,  because to have  a power is
just to  be able  to modify,  create,  or extinguish a right.  If the state
does not recognize rights,  there is nothing to  do with a power,  be-
cause  there  is  nothing  that one  can  turn  a privilege  into  except  a
duty (to  do or not do  the act  one was formerly  privileged to not do
or do  as  one  saw fit),  and  there can't be any  duties  in  a state  that
refuses  to  recognize  rights.  Everyone  being  thus  immune  against
translation  of their  universal  privilege  into  duty,  everyone  by  the
51.  A "privilege  in rem,"  by analogy with the  more familiar "right in rem,"  is a
collection of privilege/no-right relations  covering  the same U,--one for every  person
in the world other than  the holder-in  each  of which the holder  occupies  the privi-
leged end of the relation.
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same  token  is  disabled  from  turning  their  own  or  other  people's
no-rights into rights.
What  all this means  in practice is  that  the  state in  SON plays
no active part whatever in  the maintenance  or administration of its
nondirective  sector.  It is  easy  to  see  that such  an  arrangement  is
"nondirective,"  but  perhaps  not  altogether  clear  why  one  would
want  to  call  it an  "order."  However,  because  we  presuppose  that
the  state exists,  there  is  an order  in the  sense  that there is  an  or-
ganization  constituted  under recognized  public  law  rules and pos-
sessed  of enough  force  to  create  and  vindicate  rights  if those  in
charge  wanted  it  to.  Since  the  regime  of universal  privilege/no-
right, covered by universal immunity/disability,  is  thus  chosen, and
since it frames  an actual course  of behavior,  there is  no reason  not
to call it an order. The state,  by its choice of rule system,  has con-
tributed to whatever  outcomes  emerge,  and the  state's  thus condi-
tioning outcomes by  its choice  of rules  about private  interaction  is
what we mean  by a nondirective  order.52
The  Hohfeldian  WOC  consists  of the Table  of Jural  Correla-
tives  modified as  follows:
Right  P.41ygt0go  Pov0o't  Immunities
Duty  Xo/tgh  t  J  Ig-A  O$  Disabilities
Whenever  someone  else's  action  or inaction  affects  my welfare  (my
preferences),  the  state  will back me in dictating  to  that other per-
son what to do or not do:  and the same  goes for everyone else.  The
state's position is  now the opposite  of that in  SON:  it has  declared
its readiness  to  concern  itself with every  instance,  no matter  how
slight,  of impingement  by one  person's  conduct  on another's  con-
cerns,  as contrasted with its refusal in  SON to intervene to prevent
or requite an impingement no matter how grevous.  In WOC, there
is literally no such thing as damnum absque injuria;  there are no le-
gally  unprotected  interests,  there  are  no  nonproximate  chains  of
but-for  cause;  there  are  no  excuses;  everyone  is  strictly  liable  for
all  the  consequences  of every  act  and  also  for  the  non-act  that  is
the  contradictory  of every  act.  Everyone  will be  constantly  under
an  unrelieved  duty  to  do  everything  and  also  to  do  nothing.  The
state,  offering  at every moment  to enjoin  anyone to  do  and not do
everything  and  anything,  is  in  a position  to  paralyze  social  life  to-
tally.
Powers  cannot  provide  the  way  out  of this  stalemate  because
52.  See also pp. 750-51 supra.
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powers  can no more exist in WOC than in  SON.  The  defining  fea-
ture of WOC is that everyone  always  has rights respectirig  anything
that  anyone  else  might  do  or  not do.  There  are never  any  privi-
leged  acts;  and  since there  are  never  any privileges,  there  can  be
no powers,  because  to have  a  power  is  to be  able  to  modify,  cre-
ate,  or extinguish  a privilege.  If the state  does not recognize privi-
leges,  there  is  nothing to  do with  a power,  because  initially  every
possible act is covered by a duty, and there is nothing one  can turn
a  duty  into  except  its  correlative  privilege,  and  there  aren't  any
privileges  in WOC.
Stalemate  is  not, however,  the only  possible  outcome.  People
who have  rights  may  always  refrain  from  asserting  them.  Forbear-
ance  from asserting  a right doesn't entail  the existence  of a power,
and  neither  does  a  nonbinding  conspiracy  to  forbear  from  exer-
cising rights. Even a universal agreement-a constitutional "contract"
-according  to  which everyone  will refrain  from exercising  certain
rights when such is  the decision of, say,  a majority,  entails no pow-
ers as long as  the constitution  isn't itself legally binding on anyone.
So  it is  possible  that,  in WOC,  people  will find  a way  to conspire
nonbindingly  about  what  rights  over what  Uxs  will be  exercised,
by  and  against  whom,  under what  circumstances,  and  life  can  go
on.  (The first nonbinding  conspiracy might be to suspend all asser-
tions  of all  rights-i.e.,  act  as  though  they were  in SON-for  the
time it takes to work things  out more fully.)
Now,  SON,  at least at first glance,  looked nondirective,  if not
so  obviously  like an order. WOC,  when we  first encounter it, may
seem  to  be neither nondirective  nor an  order, but it is  both.  It is
an order just as  SON  is an order. The state's  existence and potency
are  presupposed,  so  the  state  could  have  created  and  vindicated
some privileges  had its governors  wanted it to.  Since the regime  of
total  perpetual joint control  has  thus  been  chosen,  and  since  that
regime frames  an actual course  of behavior (i.e.,  looking toward the
fashioning  of the  nonbinding  conspiracies),  there  is  no  reason  not
to call it an order. Whatever  outcomes emerge  will have been con-
ditioned  by the  state's  choice  of rule system,  and  state authorship
of  outcomes  by  its  choice  of  a  rule  system  for  private  affairs  is,
again, what we mean by a nondirective order.
But  in what  sense  are  affairs  in WOC  ever private?  Granting
that WOC is  an order, how is it nondirective?  Affairs  are private  in
the  sense  that outcomes  emerge  exclusively  through the  privately
motivated  interactions  of persons  wielding  individual  entitlements
(in this case,  broad rights in rem over all Ux) assigned to them by a
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rule  as  general  as  any  rule  could  be.  Whatever  happens  will  be
what  the  fights-bearing  individuals  make  happen  through  their
own,  several,  deliberate  acts.  No  state,  or  outsider,  will  at  any
time "intervene"--do anything beyond enforcing the general rule.
2.  The  Hohfeldian Definition of PPFC-In combination,  the
Hohfeldian  categories  and  the  U,  notation  seem  to  provide  a per-
fectly exhaustive,  perfectly incisive analytical vocabulary for describ-
ing  and  defining  formal  orders.  No  one  since  Hohfeld  has  ever
been  able  to  suggest  a  legal  entitlement  or relation  that  is  not ei-
ther  itself one  of the  Hohfeldian  entities  or  else  analyzable  into
such  entities,  and  no  one  today  doubts  that  his  list of entities  is
both  an  exhaustive  and  an  elementary  vocabulary  for  modes  of
entitlement.  By stipulation,  Ux can stand for any  sort of use of any
sort of thing,  no matter how broadly or narrowly conceived;  and  so
Ux is an undoubtedly  exhaustive  and elementary  vocabulary for ob-
jects of entitlement.  It seems  to follow that any  nondirective  order
should be precisely and unambiguously  describable in the language
composed of these  two vocabularies.
As  we  have  seen,  that  is  obviously  the  case  for  SON  and
WOC.  It is,  we think,  a matter of some moment for our thesis that
it is not obviously the  case  for "private  property,"  or for  "enforce-
able contract,"  or for their conjunction in PPFC. We are about to of-
fer an  analytic  definition of PPFC which  we think compatible  with
the formal order many people  have in mind when they think or say
that  PPFC  has  some  peculiar  efficiency  virtue.  We  do  not,  how-
ever,  anticipate  that  all  readers  will  accept  our  definition  as  the
proper  one;  and  certainly  there  is  nothing  logically  compelling
about it.
Here is our definition of PPFC:
1. At all times,  every U,  is  the object of both a right
in rem  and a privilege in  rem,  both of which  are held by
the  same  individual.  (The individual  who  holds  the  cou-
pled, congruent,  right-and-privilege  over a U,, will be  said
to "own" the U,.)
2.  An  owner  of a U,  has  at  all  times  an  unqualified
power  to  transfer  sole  ownership  of the  Ux  to  any  other
individual,  or to  bind himself to  make  such  a  transfer  in
the future,  as he sees fit;  and an owner  is at all times un-
qualifiedly  immune  against  having  his  ownership  of a  Ux
transferred to anyone else against his will.
3.  Whoever  owns  all  the  Ux's  that  are  used  to  pro-
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duce  any  other  thing  (a "P") owns  all  the  U's  of that  P;
and  in the  case  of P produced  using  Ux's  owned by more
than  one person,  ownership  of the  Ups  is  determined  ei-
ther by the unanimous  agreement  of all the  owners of the
U;s or, in default of such agreement,  by rules designed to
minimize  losses  sustained  over  time  by  non-consenting
owners.
What  is  most important  about  this definition  is  right/privilege
symmetry-the idea that for every Ux there is an owner who can U
the X  without  legal interference,  and at the same  time  can  invoke
the  law if some  other private party tries  to interfere  with  his  Uing
of the  X.  We  have  chosen  this  as  the  core  of our  definition  of a
property/contract  regime  in part because we think it corresponds  to
a common  intuition  of what it  means  to  say  that  a  "thing"  is  "my
property."  But  the  notion  of right/privilege  symmetry  as  the  es-
sence of the private legal order has a long history.53 As  we have  in-
timated  already,  it was  one  of Hohfeld's  main  purposes  to  refute
the  idea  that  such  symmetry  was  inevitable,  a  deductive  implica-
tion of the  concept of a legal order. We  readily  admit that there  is
a  certain  artificiality-indeed  implausibility-to  the  notion  that  a
property  regime  "is"  such  an  order. There  is  even  some  question
in  our minds  as  to whether  it  would be logically  possible  to  insti-
tute  such  a  regime in  the  real  world.  But  we  think  the  definition
useful nonetheless.  The arguments we will  make using the extreme
construct of Hohfeldian  PPFC would be valid for any other general
definition we can imagine.  And this highly  abstract formulation  will
permit  us  to  state  the  difficulties  in  the  notion  that property  and
contract are efficient  (or presumptively  efficient) much  more briefly
and precisely than would be possible  using  one of the  more famil-
iar definitions.
D.  Uncertainty and Coordination  Reconsidered
A review of our canvass  in  Parts  I and II of the arguments  for
the general  efficiency  of PPFC  will  show  that  they  all depend  on
either  (1) technical  mistakes,  or  (2) a  belief that PPFC minimizes
53.  See  J.  AUSTIN,  THE  PROVINCE  OF  JURISPRUDENCE  DETERMINED  289-90
(1832);  J. BENTHAM,  OF LAWVS  IN  GENERAL 99 (Hart ed.  1970); Donahue, The Future
of the  Concept of Property Predicted From its Past in  PROPERTY  (J.  Pennock &  J.
Chapman  eds.  1980).  For  a  full  account  of the  history  of the  right/privilege  bond
from Hobbes through Hohfeld,  see J. Singer, Legal Rights:  A History of the Justifica-
tion of Legal Violence,  Anglo-American  Analytical  Jurisprudence  from  1830  to  1930
(1980)  (unpublished manuscript in the Harvard Law School  Library).
[Vol.  8: 711
48
Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 10
http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol8/iss3/10ARE  PROPERTY AND  CONTRACT  EFFICIENT?
the  amount  of bad  uncertainty  that  people  have  to  bear,  or  (3)  a
belief that PPFC  facilitates  coordination,  or  (4) some  combination
of the  above.  We  have  already  given  intuitive  arguments  against
the  plausibility  of  beliefs  (2)  and  (3).  Here  we  make  use  of
Hohfeldian  renderings  of various  nondirective orders to  show more
perspicuously  that  those  beliefs  either  are  absurd  or  else  depend
on complex  empirical  suppositions  that no one,  so far  as we know,
has ever made  explicit much less supported with substantial  data.
1.  Uncertainty-The certainty  claim  for both private  property
and enforceable contract  is that the holder of a property or contract
right is certain  that he or she will be able to retain particular bene-
fits,  whereas  in SON  (say) there is  no  such  assurance.  The propo-
nent of the certainty argument then reasons  either that uncertainty
in  SON  will  discourage  some  desirable  activity,  or  that it is just a
"bad" in itself.
We think that one  of the purposes  of Hohfeld's  schema was  to
make  it  easy  to  see  that  such  an  argument  is  necessarily  incom-
plete,  because it fails to recognize what we call the  Law of Conser-
vation of Exposures.  Hohfeld's  analysis  makes  clear that exposures
(risks,  uncertainties)  can  never  be  eliminated,  but  only  shifted
among  persons  or classes.  This  becomes  evident  on  inspection  of
the two tables.  As  Corbin put the matter,
No  pair of opposites  can exist  together.  That  is,  when  a  person
has  a right, he  cannot  have a  no-right with  respect  to  the  same
subject  matter  and  the  same  person.  When he  has  a  privilege,
he cannot have  a duty.
Each  Pair  of correlatives  must  always  exist  together;  when
some  person  (A)  has  one  of the pair,  another  person  (B) neces-
sarily  has  the  other.  One of the  terms  expresses  the  relation  of
A to B;  the other term expresses  the relation of B to A.54
That is, from A's having a certain right or power-any we may care
to describe-it can be inferred not only that A  lacks the contradict-
ory no-right  or disability,  but also  that there is  some B  who has a
certain  ("correlative") duty or  liability;  and likewise,  from B's hav-
ing some  described privilege  or  immunity we  can infer  that there
is  some A  who  has  the  correlative  no-right  or  disability.  In  sum,
every  assertion  of a  Hohfeldian  positive  entails  the  assertion  of a
Hohfeldian  negative,  and vice-versa.
Now  suppose-as  seems  clear  upon reflection  and as  Hohfeld
54.  Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE  L.J. 163,  166 (1919).  We
have reversed  the order of Corbin's paragraphs.
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certainly intended-that  there is no entitlement which is not either
a right,  or a privilege,  or a power,  or an immunity;  and allow  fur-
ther  that  no-rights  and  disabilities  count  (as  duties  and  liabilities
obviously  do)  as  forms  of legal  exposure.  Hohfeld's  "correlatives"
table is,  then,  a precise statement  of what can be called the Law of
Reciprocity  of Entitlements  and  Exposures:  For  every  legal  en-
titlement there is an equal  and opposite  legal exposure.  And  by an
easy  step  we arrive  also  at the  Law of Conservation  of Exposures:
The sum of the legally determined  exposures  is a constant.  For the
two  tables  in  conjunction  tell  us  that  just  insofar  as  some  B  is
spared a  duty,  some A  must suffer  a no-right (and vice-versa);  and
just insofar  as  some A  is spared  a disability,  some B  must suffer  a
liability  (and vice-versa).
Since  there seem to be no legal exposures  that are neither no-
rights,  nor duties,  nor disabilities,  nor liabilities,  the law of conser-
vation  is  established.  Exposures  can be shifted but not changed in
number.  To  cancel  A's  no-right just  means  to  replace  it  with  its
"opposite"  right-transmuting  B's  erstwhile  privilege  into  its  "op-
posite"  duty-and  so  on.  The  books  are  double-entry  and  they
have  to balance.  Once  the  notion of legal  entitlement  has  entered
consciousness-or,  as the legal realist would have  it, once it occurs
to us to form expectations  or offer' predictions  about organized soci-
etal  responses  to  appeals  for  relief by  those  objecting  to  various
classes  of acts against those performing  them-that notion  is imme-
diately  pervasive  and  exhaustive.  Entitlement  abhors  a  vacuum.
Covering  any  act  that  anyone  can  be  imagined  to  do  or  suffer,
there is always either a privilege or a right, therefore always either
a duty or a no-right. The agent either is legally sanctionable  for the
act  or omission (i.e., has a duty) or she  is not (i.e.,  has a privilege);
a victim either can secure relief (i.e., has a right) or he cannot (i.e.,
has  a no-right).  There  is  no undistributed  middle.  There  is  always
an exposure.
To be sure,  this conclusion  depends  on the idea that no-rights
and disabilities  count  no less than  duties  and liabilities  as forms  of
legal  exposure.  That  they  must  so  count,  Hohfeld  was  at pains  to
insist:
It is difficult to see  ...  why ...  the "privilege + no-right"
situation is not just as  real  a jural relation as  the  precisely  oppo-
site "duty  +  right" relation  ....  A rule  of law  that permits is
just  as  real  as  a  rule  of law  that forbids; and,  similarly,  saying
that the law permits a  given act  to X as  between  himself and Y
predicates just as  genuine a legal  relation as  saying that the  law
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forbids a certain  act  to X  as  between  himself and Y. That  this is
so  seems  in some  measure,  to be  confirmed  by the  fact that the
first sort of act would ordinarily be pronounced  "lawful"  and the
second "unlawful."
55
Corbin offered a more lucid rendition of the same point:
[O]ne  who  thinks  that there  can  be  no  rule  of law  and  no
jural  relation  between  men  without  societal  constraint seems  to
insist that  law  does  nothing  but  command. There  is  no  doubt
that  the command  element is  of the  utmost importance;  and  ac-
cording  to Hohfeld's  classification  this element  is  the  factor  that
defines  rights and duties.  But it seems to some  of us  that society
not only commands but also permits ....  The rules  that deter-
mine  these  permissions  . . . are  rules  that  law  schools  have  to
teach,  that  lawyers  have  to  use  in  advising  clients,  and  that
courts  have  to  create  and  apply  in  rendering  judgments.  And
this  is true  whether there is  any societal  command  or constraint
then existing or not.  56
In  PPFC,  the  source  of certainty  is  legal  entitlement,  while
the  source  of uncertainty,  often  overlooked,  is  legal  exposure.  In
the  case  of PP,  what  the proponent  overlooks  is  the  exposure  of
the  non-owner.  The  non-owner  is  under a  duty  correlative  to  the
owner's  right  to  invoke  state  force  against  interference;  the  non-
owner  also  has a no-right to  state intervention  to  protect  him from
adverse  consequences  of the  owner's  privilege  to  use  the X  as  he
sees  fit.  These  exposures  entail  uncertainty  about  access  to  and
control over the X,  leaving the non-owner dependent  on the will of
the owner to satisfy the non-owner's  wants.
In the  contract  case,  the  certainty  comes  from  the promisee's
right to performance.  The uncertainty  overlooked  derives  from  the
promisor's  exposure-his  duty  to  perform  or  pay  damages  even  if
the  expectations  that  led him  to  enter the  contract  have  changed
drastically.  Certainty  arguments  always  celebrate  entitlements-
either  a  right/privilege  combination  (as  in  PP),  a  right  alone  (as
in contract),  or a privilege  alone,  as in the rule of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale,5 7  for  example.  That  rule  is  often  explained  by  reference  to
the  good  of assuring  the  promisor  that  he  will  not  be  subjected
55.  Hohfeld, Some Fundamental  Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial  Rea-
soning, 23 YALE  L.J.  16, 42 n.59 (1913)  (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
56.  Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30  YALE  L.J.  226,  237
(1921)  (emphasis in original).
57.  9  Exch.  Ch.  341,  156  Eng.  Rep.  145  (1854).  The  rule  sets  limits  on  a
contract-breaker's  liability in damages  for the harmful  consequences  of breach.
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to  disastrous  liabilities  he  couldn't  have  predicted  and  therefore
didn't expect.58  But  the rule  is  one  of privilege-the  privilege  of
the promisor  to  inflict  injury  by  breach  so long  as  the  injury  was
neither contracted about  in advance nor a "natural" consequence  of
breach. The privilege  has its correlative  exposure  in the no-right of
the promisee  to  recover  damages  for injuries  of the kind specified.
And  this no-right creates  an uncertainty  for the promisee,  who can
never know  for sure  that he won't suffer  uncompensated  losses by
breach of contract.
Of course,  as  we  said  in the  discussions  of property  and  con-
tract,  it  may  as  a matter  of fact  be  true  that  a  given  entitlement
generates  more benefits from certainty than its correlative  exposure
generates  "bads"  from  uncertainty.  But  that is  a  strictly  empirical
question. The Law of Conservation  tells us that there will be  a per-
son experiencing  the potential bad every time we confer the poten-
tial good  on  an entitlement holder.  It follows  that there can  be  no
merely  logical  demonstration  that  any  particular  entitlement  re-
duces  uncertainty.  As  we  move,  for  example,  from  SON  toward
PPFC,  we convert  privileges  into  rights.  And  by the  Law of Con-
servation,  we necessarily  also  convert  the  exposure  implicit in  no-
rights  into that implicit  in duties.  Whether  the total  of the good  of
certainty  and  the  bad  of  uncertainty  increases  or  decreases  de-
pends  on how the various  people in the system feel about  their sit-
uation before and after the change.
2.  Coordination-Readers may  have  noticed  that  our  pro-
posed  Hohfeldian  specification  for  a  PPFC  regime  leaves  some-
thing to be desired from the standpoint of trying to avoid prisoners'
dilemmas,  or to  minimize  transaction  costs,  information  costs,  and
other strategic  obstacles  to consummation  of gainful trades.  The ba-
sic idea of that definition  is to stipulate that for each  of various  acts
respecting various  objects  (U,)  having utility for production  or con-
sumption,  there  is  just  one  legally  assured  entitlement  to  deter-
mine  the  use  and  enjoy  the  resulting  benefits  (or  suffer  the  re-
sulting  losses).  The  owner  may  direct  the  use  to  consumption  or
production,  as he pleases,  without  anyone's  being able  to  summon
state  force  against  him;  may  have  the  state's  assistance  to prevent
anyone  else from  interfering with his  control of the  use;  and  may,
if he  prefers,  give  or  sell  full  control  over  it  to  anyone  else  he
chooses,  on whatever  terms he likes.
58.  Cf. Kennedy,  supra note  31,  at  1743-45  (permitting  breach  of  altruistic
duty will encourage transactions in general).
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All  that  may  sound just  right  to  those  who,  ignoring  trans-
action  costs,  are  prone  to  think  that PPFC  is  efficient  for  a  pop-
ulation  of rational  maximizers  because  of  its  effect  of correlating
information,  control,  and  motivation  so  as  to  generate  efficient
incentives.  For  those  sensitive  to  coordination  problems,  though,
there are  three  distinct respects  in which our proposed  Hohfeldian
specification  for PPFC  must seem  too purist or extreme to promise
even  tolerable  efficiency:  First,  under  our  specification  PPFC  is
given  a boundless  range,  defined  as covering every Ux and  thus all
of its possible  domain-including,  to take just one example  of inept
coverage,  the  navigable  airspace  that  on  any  sane  conception  of
economic  rationality ought  to be,  under  current  technological  con-
ditions,  a  reserved  zone  of universal  privilege  qualified,  if at  all,
only by collective  rights of traffic  control.  This we call the  question
of boundaries.
Second,  under  our specification  the  PPFC  order is potentially
composed of broadly scattered entitlements  over minuscule,  atomic
Ux's--carved  up  along  spatial,  temporal,  and  functional  lines  into
fragments  that can be arbitrarily tiny as long as they remain coher-
ent,  intelligible  objects  each  with  a  modicum  of  independent
utility-and  this  without  regard  to  the  horrendous  coordination
problems  that  may have  to  be  faced  when numerous  such  atomic
holdings  have  to  be coordinated  for efficient  production.  The defi-
nition,  for  example,  does  not  rule  out  the  possibility  that  a  five-
acre  area of woodland  might be parceled  out as  follows:  Birding  on
Mondays  to A,  on Tuesdays  to B,  etc.; logging  in  the mornings  to
H, in the  evenings  to I,  etc.; beet agriculture  for life  to 0,  remain-
der to P, etc. This we call the question of composition.
Third,  under  our  specification  there  is  no  room  for  legally
sanctioned  versions  either  of  competition  or  of  the  practice  of
mutual  toleration  of injuries.  Competition  is  impossible  because  it
presupposes  two actors  each  of whom  is privileged  to inflict on the
other  the  injury  of loss  of trade  or  of some  other  advantage.  Nei-
ther competitor has a right symmetrical  to this privilege,  since nei-
ther can sue the other for the loss of the customer  (or other advan-
tage) that he is perfectly  free to take if he can.  The  issue of mutual
toleration  of injuries  is that of the excuses  we  allow for infliction of
injuries  within  the universe  of Us subject  to  PPFC.  In  a  world
where  there  were  matching  rights  and privileges  for  every  Ux,  it
could not be the case  that I was privileged  to destroy your posses-
sions accidentally,  but that you were at the same time privileged to
fend off the injury.  Yet  such  situations  are pervasive.  We  call this
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question  of what  to  do  about  conflict  within  PPFC  the  issue  of
structure.
Reflecting  separately  on the questions of boundaries,  composi-
tion,  and structure,  one is  led to like  conclusions  each time.  First,
the  actual  legal  orders  familiar  to us  do  not correspond  to  PPFC.
Our legal system,  in particular,  constricts  PPFC  within boundaries
outside which  there  is  SON  or WOC.  It restricts  freedom  of con-
tract by imposing all kinds of limitations  on decomposition  of Ux's.
It  resolves  the  problem  of internal  structure  by  creating  lacunae
within  which,  in spite  of the  fact that we are  dealing  with legally
protected  interests,  the parties  are privileged  to  inflict injury with-
out enjoying corresponding  rights not to be injured.
Second,  it seems  overwhelmingly  likely that  at least  some  of
these  deviations  from  PPFC are  motivated  by  an  accurate  assess-
ment of the disastrous  efficiency consequences  of taking PPFC seri-
ously  as a  design for  an entire  legal  order.  A PPFC order is likely
to  be  efficient  only  insofar  as  it  has  been  deliberately  worked
over-restricted,  qualified,  and specified-with  a view to making it
efficient,  only insofar as the right matters have been  excluded from
its  range,  the  right  limits  imposed  on  decomposition  of holdings,
the  right  mix  specified  of  liability  and  nonliability  for  conse-
quences.  Working  in  the  requisite  exclusions,  limits,  and  mixes
means  introducing  elements  of  SON  and  WOC  into  the  order.
From  one  standpoint,  the  result can  be  described  as  "PPFC  with
pockets  of  SON  and  WOC";  but  equally  valid  characterizations
would  be  "SON  with  pockets  of  PPFC  and  WOC,"  and  "WOC
with  pockets  of SON  and  PPFC."  Thus  in  whatever  sense  PPFC
can be said  to be efficient,  the same  can be  said of both  SON  and
WOC.
We  now take a closer look at each of the three questions.
a.  Boundaries-It is  obvious  that  real  legal  systems  never  at-
tempt a global,  domain-covering  version  of PPFC.  Here  are  some
salient ways  in which they fall short:  (a) They establish commonses,
SON-like  zones  of universal  in  rem  privilege  over  real  resources
like  the  air  and  the  seas,  and  also  over  zones  defined  less  con-
cretely,  such  as  emotional  states,  many  intra-family  matters,  and
contracts  deemed  unenforceable  because  based  on want  of consid-
eration  or  on  inappropriate  subject  matter,  like  illegal  but  non-
criminal  undertakings  and  mere  "social"  obligations.  (b) They  es-
tablish  WOC-like  areas  of collective  compulsion,  such  as  compul-
sory  service  by  utilities  and  compuslory  improvements  or
maintenance  of property,  and  of collective  prohibition  (marked  by
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the  fact that no private  consent can  confer  a privilege)  concerning
such varied matters as  sexual  behavior (prostitution, adultery,  etc.),
fraud,  and pollution,  and encompassing  thousands  of police  power
regulations  ranging  from  zoning  to  bans  on  shotgunning birds  on
one's  own land.
These  cases  pose  a problem  for  the  thesis that  PPFC  is  effi-
cient  for  rational  maximizers  because  they  are  cases  in  which  it
would be possible to apply a regime of property and contract but in
which  judges  and  legislators  refuse  to  do  so.  That  leaves  us with
two possible  ways  to defend the  efficiency thesis.  The first is  to in-
sist that the  exclusions  from  PPFC are,  indeed, all inefficient but
justifiable  even  so by reason  of their service  to  some nonefficiency
aim  or value.  The second  is  to admit that at least some  of the  ex-
clusions  make  sense  from  the  standpoint  of efficiency.  We  doubt
that  anyone will  seriously take  the  first line,  and  don't propose  to
say  any  more  about  it.  But  the  second  line  is  tantamount  to
admitting  that  not  PPFC,  but  some  tasteful  confection  of PPFC,
SON,  and  WOC  is  what  is  efficient-unless  there  is  some  signifi-
cant sense  in  which  the  whole  confection  is  identifiably  PPFC,  a
possibility we find ourselves  unable to fathom.
It  seems,  in  short,  that  we  have  here  a  case  illustrating
Wittgenstein's  reputed  dictum  that  no  rule  can  determine  its
own application. 59 The property  regime  is a set of rules concerning
what to  do  about property;  it is  not a set of rules  concerning  what
should and should not be property. If the efficiency  of property de-
pends  on the  rules being applied  to the right things,  then without
a new set of rules about which things,  we can't say  anything signifi-
cant about property's  efficiency in general.
b.  Composition-Just as  all  real  legal  systems  exclude  some
parts  of PPFC's  possible  range from  its actual  domain,  so  do  they
all  impose  restrictions  on  the  decomposition  of possible  objects  of
ownership  into  parts  that can be  separately  owned.  Our own  legal
system  struggles  over whether  parts  of a  live  human body  can be
owned  by  anyone  but  the  owner  of  the  whole  body.60  It  has
frowned  upon  the  creation  of nonpartitionable  tenancies  in  com-
mon;61  the  splitting  off of  alienable  easements  in  gross  from  the
59.  See  F.  KESSLER  &  G.  GILMORE,  CONTRACTS  653  (2d  ed.  1970);  L.
WrrTGENSTEIN,  PHILOSOPHICAL  INVESTIGATIONS  §§  84-87,  at  391-41  (3d  ed.  G.
Anscome  trans.  1958);  L. WITTGENSTEIN,  THE  BLUE  AND  BROWN  BOOKS  90-91,  97
(1958).
60.  See Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72  MICH. L. REV.  1182 (1974).
61.  Clark v. Clark,  99 Md. 356, 58 A. 24 (1904). Tenants in common  are each en-
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balance  of the  possessory  entitlement  to  land;62 the  encumbrance
of present possessory  entitlements  with entitlements  to future  pos-
session that are subject to contingencies  that might  remain in abey-
ance  for  longer  than lives-in-being-plus-twenty-one-years. 63 At  the
same  time,  as  these very  examples  help  to  show,  our  system  does
permit decomposition  very liberally,  including decomposition of the
right/irivilege coupling that our Hohfeldian specification for prop-
erty  treated as  atomic.  Not  only  may  rights/privileges  over  con-
crete objects  like land surface  be legally chopped up into arbitrarily
small spatio-temporal  bits,  but also privileges  may be split off from
their  symmetrical  rights,  as  with  nonexclusive  affirmative  ease-
ments  (such  as  rights-of-way);  rights  may  be  split  off from  their
symmetrical  privileges,  as with  restrictive  covenants  and equitable
servitudes;  powers and immunities  may be split off from their  sym-
metrical right/privilege  pairs,  as with the doctrine  of bona fide pur-
chaser  under a  recording  act;64  and  even  the  seemingly  essential
PP condition  of sole entitlement  may  be violated,  i.e.,  "undivided"
shares  of  Ux's  may  be  held  by  tenants  in  common,  and  even-if
held  by  a  married  couple  as  tenants  by  the  entireties-made
nonconvertible  into  holdings  in  severalty  except  by  the  collective
action of both the tenants (or the death of one of them).6 5
As  with  boundary  exclusions,  the  zones  of  tolerance  for
subatomic decomposition  all represent the order's acceptance  of el-
ements of SON  and WOC.  If several  of us hold nonexclusive  privi-
leges  (profits-a-prendre)  to  fish  in  "your"  lake,  we  are  as  to  that
matter in a SON-like  state; neighbors in a subdivision  covered  by a
network  of reciprocal  equitable  servitudes  (specifically  enforceable
titled to  the use and enjoyment of the common  property. Partition  is a legal remedy
for  avoiding  the  potential  economic  awkwardness  obviously  implicit  in  such  an
arrangement-a judicial  division or judicially  supervised  liquidation  and  division  of
the proceeds, resulting in individual  ownership of the moieties.
62.  E.g.,  Stockdale v. Yerden, 220  Mich.  444,  190  N.W. 225  (1922);  Boatman v.
Lasley, 23  Ohio  St. 614  (1873).  An  "easement  in gross"  is a  special, personal  privi-
lege to make a particular use of another's  land.
63.  See generally J. GRAY,  THE RULE  AGAINST  PERPETUITIES (4th ed.  1942);  R.
LYNN,  THE MODERN  RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1966).
64.  Under  the  typical  "notice"  or  "race-notice"  type  of recording  statute,  a
grantee  or purchaser  of property  who fails  to get his  conveyance  spread on  the re-
cords  in time is  liable to be divested  of his title by  a later good-faith purchaser who
thus has the power of divesting the former's title. E.g.,  Earle v. Fiske, 103  Mass. 491,
492 (1870).
65.  See Carlisle v. Parker, 38 Del.  83, 84-85, 188  A. 67,  69-70 (Super. Ct.  1936);
Robinson v. Trousdale  County, 516  S.W.2d 626, 627-28 (Tenn. 1974).  Tenancy by the
entireties is  a  form  of co-ownership  peculiar  to married  couples.  Assets  so  held be-
come the sole property of the surviving spouse upon the death of the first to die.
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use restrictions) are,  as to  that matter,  in a  WOC-like  state;66 ten-
ancy  in  common  is  itself  an  ambiguous  compound  of  SON  and
WOC-WOC  insofar  as  the  law allows  none  of the  tenants  to  ex-
clude  others  from the res without the latters'  consent,  SON insofar
as the law  allows each  to use the res at will as  long as  others don't
object  (even  if  the  reason  they  don't  object  is  that  they  don't
know). 67
As  with  boundary  exclusions,  the  zones  of  tolerance  for
subatomic  decomposition can be explained either as uniformly  inef-
ficient  exceptions  from  the PPFC  order,  tolerated only  because  of
their  service  to noneconomic  values,  or as  (at least  in  some  cases)
efficient  adaptations  of the order. As before,  we regard  the first ex-
planation  as too  implausible  to  dwell upon,  and the second  as tan-
tamount  to  an  admission  that  whatever  the  circumstantially  effi-
cient order is,  it  is  no more  PPFC  in principle  than it  is  SON  or
WOC.
c.  Structure-We now suppose-though  we  haven't a  clue  as
to how it would be done-that both the boundary and composition
problems  have been  solved in some  unproblematic  way,  so  that we
have  comprehensively  established  both  the  classes  of objects  that
are  and  are  not  appropriate  for  an  efficient  PP  regime,  and  the
kinds  and  degrees  of decomposition  that  the  regime  can  tolerate
while  remaining  efficient.  We  could  then,  supposedly,  define  a
private property  ideal  type  as follows:  There  is a  determinate  class
of objects-i.e.,  of Ux,  specified uses of specified things; the objects
are  not  legally  subdivisible;  each  object  in  the  class  belongs  to  a
sole  owner;  each  owner  has  in  rem privileges  over the  object that
exactly  correspond  with  his  in  rem  rights  over the object-a  sym-
metrical  right/privilege.  We  now address the question whether it is
possible  to  say that such  a regime is  efficient,  even  supposing that
the "correct" boundaries  and composition rules have been  chosen.
The problem  we face  is that of excuses,  defenses,  and damnun
absque injuria. Real  legal  systems  all  seem  to  contain  nonliability
rules of the following types:
(a)  General excuses for intentional invasion of rights (e.g.,
duress,  self-defense,  necessity,  competition,  mistake).
(b)  The defense  of "no proximate cause."
(c)  The  absence  in  many or  most cases  of liability for  failure
66.  That is,  each individual  owner may be entitled  to obtain  or insist upon  en-
forcement of the restriction against all the rest, so that none  can  be excused without
unanimous consent. See Berger v. Van Sweringen  Co., 6 Ohio  St. 2d  100,  216 N.E.2d
54 (1966).
67.  See McKnight v. Basilides, 19 Wash. 2d. 391,394-95, 143 P.2d 307,309 (1943).
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to act-even,  in some  cases,  when  the  non-act  is  chosen
consciously  in  order to inflict injury on  a legally  protected
interest.
(d)  The excuses  of "inevitable  accident,"  "accident,"  and  "no
malice,"  each applying in some cases but not others.
The existence  of these forms  of damnum absque injuria means
that  as a matter  of fact  there are  no classes of objects  with respect
to which  there is full symmetry  of rights  and privileges.  They  give
rise to  a wide variety  of situations  in which  I am  privileged  to use
my X  in a particular way,  but have  no right so to use  it. I can  use
the X  to  inflict  damage  on another  person  without  having  to pay
compensation,  but the  other person  is  privileged  to  resist  the  in-
jury by interfering with  my use,  rather than being under a duty to
let me  be.  Suppose,  for  example,  that you  attempt  to  injure  me,
under the mistaken impression that I am  assaulting you. If you suc-
ceed,  you will not be liable  for my injuries, but I am privileged  to
defend  myself. I will not be liable if, in  so  doing,  I injure you.  Or
take  the  case  of  a  person  having  a  seizure,  who  threatens  an
unintentional  injury  for which  there  would be  no  liability.  Again,
there  is  a  privilege  of resistance  on  the  part  of those  threatened
rather than  a duty to  submit to injury.  The line at which the  sym-
metry  of right and privilege  is  restored  is neatly illustrated  by the
case  of Ploof v.  Putnam, 68  where  it was  held  that  the  owner  of a
vessel in distress was not only privileged  to trespass  on a dock,  but
had a right that the dock owner not cast the vessel off.69
Having found the  existence  of asymmetry  by reason  of the  ex-
istence  of privileges  without  symmetrical  rights,  we  naturally  ex-
pect  also  to  come upon  rights without  symmetrical  privileges,  and
of course  we  do:  for  example,  some  of the  rights  guarded  by the
law  of  nuisance  and  many  private  rights  created  by  public  reg-
ulatory  law.  If running  a  house  of prostitution  or  a  gambling  hall
is  a nuisance,  that means that I have  a right that you  not interfere
with my quiet enjoyment  of my land  by exposing  me  to the activ-
ity, but it does not follow,  and it is not true, that I have  an equiva-
lent  privilege  to  inflict  this  experience  on  myself. Rather  than  a
situation in which  I can  do  it to  myself but not to  you,  while  you
can  do  it to yourself but not to me, we  are in a situation  where no
one can  do  it at  all,  even  when  it is  arguable  that  no  one  else  is
affected.
68.  81 Vt. 471, 71 A.  188 (1908).
69.  Id. at 476,  71 A. at 189.
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These  cases,  we  may  note,  are WOC-like,  just as  the  cases  of
universal  privilege  to  act innocently  and  non-negligently  (or under
duress,  or  in  self-defense,  or  competitively,  or  passively),  despite
adverse  consequences  for another's  enjoyment  of his things,  can be
described  as  pockets  of SON. Thus  the  situation here seems  to re-
semble closely that which we encountered  in exploring the bound-
ary and  composition  questions:  As  to  all three questions,  there  ap-
pears  to  be  a  choice between  explaining  observed  deviations  from
the  pure  form  of PPFC  order  as  all  inefficient  but justifiable  on
other grounds,  and  admitting that without  at least  some of the  de-
viations  the  order  could  not possibly  be  considered  efficient;  and
since  the  first line  is  utterly implausible  we  are  forced  to  the  sec-
ond, which  is tantamount  to admitting  that the circumstantially  ef-
ficient order is,  in principle,  no less SON or WOC than it is pp.70
E.  Nondirective Orders Revisited:
The Inconceivability of Nonregulatory  Efficiency
We began these reflections  by introducing  the notion of formal
or nondirective orders  and offering to develop  an analytical method
for  comparatively  evaluating  the  prima  facie  efficiency  virtues  of
various  species  of that genus.  By  that  offer  we  of course  implied
that a nondirective  order can be efficient,  more  or less. The upshot
of the reflections,  however,  is  that our  implication  was wrong  and
that  there  is-can be-no  such  thing  as  an  efficient  nondirective
order.
The  reason  for  this  nihilistic  conclusion  is  not  empirical  or
technical  but  mental  and  conceptual:  In  the  frame  of  mind  in
which  one sees  an  order  as more  or less  efficiently  adapted to  cir-
cumstantial facts respecting wants  and proclivities,  one has to see it
as  intervention-as a regulatory phenomenon.  An  efficient  order,
we  have  shown,  will  always  contain  elements  of cognizable  non-
directive  orders-SON,  WOC,  PPFC  (if it, indeed,  is  cognizable).
No  doubt others could be invented which would  do the conceptual
work  as well-but in  an efficient  order these elements  will not be
70.  This  is  not to  be confused  with  a conclusion  that the actual  body of legal
doctrine pertaining  to property  and contract is efficient, or that all the observable de-
viations from the pure  form of PPFC represent gropings  toward efficiency-a conclu-
sion  that  is  itself  extremely  implausible.  See  generally  Michelman,  Norms  and
Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN.  L. REV.  1015 (1978).  See also
Michelman,  Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review, 13
CREIGHTON  L.  REV.  487 (1979);  Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination: Competing Judicial Models  of Local  Government Legitimacy,  53
IND.  L. REv.  145 (1977).
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combined in accordance with any  cognizable  rule or set of rules ex-
pressible through any short list of parsimonious,  axiomatic  formulas
or principles.  The combination is and must be ad hoc,  deliberately
contrived,  and  from  time  to  time  recontrived,  to  fit  the  shifting
mosaic  of wants  and  proclivities  (and  technology,  and  resources,
etc.,  etc.).  But  to  go  about  the  task  of continually  choosing  and
combining  these pieces  of PPFC,  SON,  and  WOC,  with a view  to
maximizing some want-regarding  social objective  function  like total
wealth  (or total  welfare,  or  per-capita  welfare,  or  equal-per-capita
wealth)  is,  precisely,  to  be  engaged  in  intervention.  The  case  is
not,  then,  that  WOC  stands  for  total  regulation,  SON  for  aimless
disorder,  and  PPFC  for  nondirective  order or  freedom-under-law.
The case  is that, taken separately,  these are all conceivable  as  non-
directive  orders,  but mixed together ad hoc  they are all ingredients
of regulation.  Insofar  as  they have  anything  whatever  to  do  with
efficiency,  private  property  and  free  contract  are  species  of inter-
vention.
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